








Towards an Administrative Law of Central 
Banking 
Peter Conti-Brown,† Yair Listokin†† & Nicholas R. Parrillo††† 
A world in turmoil caused by Covid-19 has revealed again what has 
long been true: the Federal Reserve is arguably the most powerful 
administrative agency in government, but neither administrative-law 
scholars nor the Fed itself treat it that way. In this Article, we present the 
first effort to map the contours of what administrative law should mean for 
the Fed, with particular attention to the processes the Fed should follow in 
determining and announcing legal interpretations and major policy 
changes. First, we synthesize literature from administrative law and social 
science to show the advantages that an agency like the Fed can glean from 
greater openness and transparency in its interpretations of law and in its 
long-term policymaking processes. These advantages fall into two 
categories: (1) sending more credible signals of future action and thereby 
shaping the behavior of regulated parties and other constituents, and (2) 
increasing the diversity of incoming information on which to base 
decisions, thereby improving their factual and predictive accuracy. Second, 
we apply this framework to two key areas—monetary policy and 
emergency lending—to show how the Fed can improve its policy signaling 
and input diversity in the areas of its authority that are most expansive. 
The result is a positive account of what the Fed already does as an 
administrative agency and a normative account of what it should do in 
order to preserve necessary policy flexibility without sacrificing the public 
demands for policy clarity and rigor. 
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Introduction 
This Article articulates an administrative-law theory for arguably the 
most important administrative agency in the United States: the nation’s 
central bank, the U.S. Federal Reserve. The Fed has the awesome power 
to regulate the value of money and determine the path of monetary policy, 
a policy base that brings it into the homes and businesses of nearly every 
American. It is the first responder in an economic crisis, deploying massive 
resources and aggressive legal interpretations to prevent national 
economic collapse, often with minimal oversight.  
These are not instances of latent power, as the Fed’s reaction to the 
Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated. After almost immediately running 
out of its conventional tools of interest-rate regulation and bank lending,1 
the Fed has now announced almost $3 trillion in additional support for 
banks and other financial institutions;2 corporations large and small, 
through commercial-debt purchase programs;3 broker-dealers and their 
clients;4 small businesses in need of financing that banks are unable or 
unwilling to provide;5 cities, counties, and states, entailing value judgments 
about which regional governments to support;6 foreign governments, 
                                                                                                             
1. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Issues 
FOMC Statement (Mar. 15, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200315a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9R9Z-VA32]. 
2. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement on Use of the 
Discount Window (Mar. 16, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20200316a1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U2MQ-UDH4]. 
3. Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. 
(Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/pmccf.htm 
[https://perma.cc/HLK5-3N9R]. 
4. Primary Dealer Credit Facility, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. (Sept. 8, 
2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/pdcf.htm [https://perma.cc/2ZKQ-VZZR]. 
5. Main Street Lending Program, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. (Sept. 8, 
2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mainstreetlending.htm 
[https://perma.cc/CGJ2-8VBA].  
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including those engaged in trade disputes with the United States;7 and 
other government agencies whose congressionally appropriated 
emergency responses have been slow and encumbered.8  
Indeed, in an unprecedented move, the U.S. Congress, through the 
CARES Act of 2020, has given the Fed—not the U.S. Treasury, the usual 
instrument of fiscal policy—the driver’s seat in administering financial 
support for the crisis. Congress appropriated $454 billion to the Treasury 
for the exclusive purpose of investing in Fed facilities.9 This money cannot 
be spent under the President’s own discretion; it may only go to emergency 
facilities created by the Federal Reserve.10 
As a conceptual matter, the Fed’s enormous exercises of power are 
no different from what all administrative agencies do: the Fed is 
interpreting its governing statutes and making policy choices about how to 
exercise the discretion left it by those statutes. The difference is in the 
breadth of impact: given the importance of these interpretations and policy 
choices for the global economy and for nearly every American, the Fed’s 
exercise of administrative power is more momentous than nearly all other 
administrative agencies.  
Despite the Fed’s position at the apex of administrative power, 
administrative law, as an academic field, has largely ignored it.11 The main 
reason for this historical neglect is that administrative law conventionally 
                                                                                                             
7. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., FIMA Repo Facility FAQs, 
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/fima-repo-facility-
faqs.htm [https://perma.cc/4CW5-VYHH]. 
8. Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE 
SYS. (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/ppplf.htm 
[https://perma.cc/G9UU-P7FC]. 
9. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4003, 134 
Stat. 281, 470 (2020). 
10. For more on the Fed-Treasury Fund, see Peter Conti-Brown, Explaining the New 
Fed-Treasury Emergency Fund, BROOKINGS, (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/explaining-the-new-fed-treasury-emergency-fund/ 
[https://perma.cc/C9FC-PZGB]. 
11. See Gillian Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The 
Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 129, 131 (2015) (taking the Fed as an “archetype[]” of financial regulation 
and noting that “in many ways administrative law and financial regulation now stand poles apart,” 
“divided not simply by their separation in law school curricula and faculty, but even more by 
opposite precepts and framing principles”). A disjunctive Westlaw search of article titles in the 
Administrative Law Review, on June 24, 2020, for “Federal Reserve,” “the Fed,” “Board of 
Governors,” “Federal Open Market Committee,” or “FOMC” produces one article, compared 
with higher totals for the full names or abbreviations of many other agencies, such as the FCC 
(20), FTC (13), FDA (13), SEC (14), EPA (10), FERC (7), OSHA (6), NLRB (5), and NRC (4). 
Separate from administrative law and its primarily institutional and procedural perspective, there 
is of course a legal literature on the Fed that takes the perspective of substantive law—that is, 
banking and financial regulation. E.g., ERIC POSNER, LAST RESORT: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND 
THE FUTURE OF BAILOUTS 55-74 (2018). 
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centers itself on judicial review of agency action.12 But the Fed rarely finds 
itself hailed into court, and it rarely must go to court to get what it wants. 
In the realm of monetary policy, the Fed operates either through 
uncontested uses of regulatory authority over banks or through voluntary 
buyer-seller transactions with impact that is profound, but also generalized 
and indirect—meaning nobody has standing to sue.13 In emergency 
lending, the nature and timing of a crisis have made it difficult for litigation 
to play any practical role.14 Overall, the rarity of Fed litigation is a 
testament to the Fed’s nearly unique power and autonomy. Ironically, that 
same rarity renders the Fed invisible in the dominant, court-centered 
paradigm of administrative law. There has admittedly been some recent 
attention to the Fed in one legal field that overlaps with administrative 
law—constitutional separation of powers15—but the Fed continues to be 
neglected when it comes to matters in the heartland of administrative law: 
the agency’s practices for interpreting law and its processes for making 
decisions. Conversely, interpretive and procedural issues at the Fed remain 
virtually ignored by the macroeconomists who pay most attention to the 
Fed.16 
                                                                                                             
12. For a classic text critiquing the court-centered view, see JERRY L. MASHAW, 
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 1-16 (1983).  
13. For cases holding that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge Fed open-market 
operations because plaintiffs’ economic injuries are indirectly caused and generalized, see Melcher 
v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 766 F.2d 538, 541-43 (D.C. Cir. 1985); and Reuss v. Balles, 
584 F.2d 461, 468-71 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
14. See infra Section III.F.  
15. This literature has done much to analyze and evaluate Congress’s broad delegations 
of power to the Fed and the Fed’s relationships to and independence from Congress and the 
President. See, e.g., SARAH BINDER & MARK SPINDEL, THE MYTH OF INDEPENDENCE: HOW 
CONGRESS GOVERNS THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2017); PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 179-217 (2016); LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & DESMOND 
KING, FED POWER: HOW FINANCE WINS 62-91, 131-160 (2016); GARY B. MILLER & ANDREW B. 
WHITFORD, ABOVE POLITICS: BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT 103-
17, 201-12 (2017); PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN 
CENTRAL BANKING AND THE REGULATORY STATE 294-300, 308-16, 334-42, 550-56 (2018); Neil 
H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Don’t End or Audit the Fed: Central Bank Independence in an 
Age of Austerity, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 63-79 (2016); Metzger, supra note 11, at 131-37;  
Edward Rubin, Hyperdepoliticization, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 631, 665-72 (2012); David T. 
Zaring, Law and Custom at the Federal Open Market Committee, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
157, 171-75, 180-84 (2015). For a review of work by economists on central banks’ independence, 
mandates, and powers, see Ricardo Reis, Central Bank Design, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 17, 18-33 
(2013).  
16. Another factor that contributes to the lack of interest in law amongst 
macroeconomists and the dearth of Fed scholarship in administrative law is the underdeveloped 
nature of law and macroeconomics. YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL 
REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS 3-6 (2019); Yair Listokin, Law and Macro: What Took So Long?, 83 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (2020) (explaining why law and economics has historically been 
dominated by microeconomics rather than macroeconomics). Legal scholars often lack 
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This lack of attention leaves unanswered some of the most basic 
questions of administrative law as applied to the Federal Reserve: How do 
Fed officials interpret the statutes that give them so much power? What 
process, if any, constrains them in the momentous policy choices they 
make? Do they listen (or explain their choices) to anybody on the outside? 
The Fed’s recent history is marked by a level of secrecy, an absence 
of comprehensible legal process, and an institutional closure utterly 
foreign to most federal regulation, making these questions difficult to 
answer. Take the two examples that will be the focus of this Article. First, 
the Fed’s explanation for its historic and non-obvious 2012 interpretation 
that its statutory mandate to promote “maximum employment” and 
“stable prices”17 justified the announcement of a two-percent inflation 
target, but not a similar target for employment—what then-Vice Chair 
Janet Yellen called a “constitution” for the Fed18—ran to a single page.19 
(The Fed’s explanation of the 2020 revision of this constitution was 
similarly confined to a single page.) Second, its claim that law compelled 
its refusal to rescue Lehman Brothers in 2008—resulting in what former 
Fed Chair Ben Bernanke admitted was a “catastrophe”20—has been 
discussed only in shifting explanations offered by either retired officials or 
in testimony and memos that the Fed disclosed only in response to a 
congressional investigation.  
In this Article, we begin the project of articulating what the 
administrative law of the Federal Reserve should be. We focus particularly 
on the policies and procedures suitable for the Fed when it develops and 
announces major policy changes. In this account, we demonstrate that the 
Fed’s interpretive methods, procedural constraints, and institutional 
openness or closure can be greatly illuminated by the field of 
administrative law.21 A huge amount of scholarship in that field has 
                                                                                                             
rudimentary macroeconomic expertise, making them understandably reluctant to focus on the 
Fed. And without a core of legal scholars producing relevant scholarship, macroeconomists have 
been able to avoid confronting many of the legal aspects of their policies. 
17. 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2018). 
18. Transcript of Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on January 24-25, 2012, 
at 46-47, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20120125meeting.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RZ2X-CSCF] [hereinafter Transcript of Jan. 24-25].  
19. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STATEMENT ON LONGER-RUN 
GOALS AND MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY (Jan. 24, 2012), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_LongerRunGoals.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4ZSF-U5PG].   
20. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
THE CAUSE OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 435 (2011) 
(quoting testimony of Ben Bernanke). 
21. For the work that has done the most thus far to make these types of connections, by 
a political scientist, see PHILIP A. WALLACH, TO THE EDGE: LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY, AND THE 
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explored these questions indirectly in asking how courts should review 
agency interpretation and process. A growing number of studies further 
examine agency interpretation and process in their own right, casting aside 
the judicial lens altogether.  
Our thesis is that an administrative law of central banking would drive 
the Fed to take more seriously the advantages of transparency and 
openness in the agency’s adoption of generally applicable interpretations 
of law and in its procedures for originating and updating its general long-
term policies. We emphasize two related advantages, both drawn from the 
larger literatures on administrative law and administrative governance. 
First, transparency and openness can strengthen the Fed’s capacity to 
signal credible commitments in a way that will help control inflation, limit 
unemployment, and avert or mitigate financial crises. Second, 
transparency and openness increase the diversity of input into Fed 
                                                                                                             
RESPONSES TO THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS (2015). This work considers how the crisis-response 
agencies’ compliance with and stretching of law, and their varying levels of opacity and 
transparency, affected the legitimacy of their work in 2008-2010. Our project has a different focus 
than Wallach’s. Whereas his subject is crisis response, covering all agencies engaged in it 
(including the Fed), our focus is on the Fed as an institution in two of its principal functions: crisis 
response and monetary policy. More importantly, our argument is fundamentally different from 
Wallach’s. His book is a moderate defense of the idea that legitimacy—public acceptance of 
governmental decisions—is a goal that agencies can meaningfully seek to achieve through, among 
other things, the legality of their outcomes and transparency of their processes. We are skeptical 
that any predictions can be made about the effect of Fed interpretive practices or procedures on 
public acceptance of what the Fed does, given that such acceptance depends so much on other 
factors like the state of the economy, political partisanship, and the quality of information 
presented to society about Fed actions. We argue instead that transparency and openness have 
more immediate, instrumental, and functional advantages, apart from whatever effects they may 
have on legitimacy. These are in the form of better, more credible signaling to shape regulated-
party incentives and richer input from more diverse sources to improve the accuracy of the 
agency’s factual and predictive judgments. For more on our view of legitimacy, see infra note 80 
and accompanying text. Besides Wallach’s work on crisis response, there is some prior legal 
literature on transparency of communications in monetary policy. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, 
From Fedspeak to Forward Guidance: Regulatory Dimensions of Central Bank Communications, 
50 GA. L. REV. 213, 240-44 (2015) (arguing that most Fed communications about monetary policy 
are a “species of regulation” that should be subject to “some regulatory review” since the 
communications are “binding” much in the way that regulatory actions are binding); Benjamin W. 
Cramer & Martin E. Halstuk, Crash and Learn: The Inability of Transparency Laws to Penetrate 
American Monetary Policy, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 195, 214-32 (2016) (reviewing doctrine 
on the applicability of FOIA and FACA to monetary policy); Reis, supra note 15, at 33-36 
(reviewing work by economists on monetary policy communications). Also, in some of the works 
cited earlier that focus on delegation and constitutional structure, there are brief discussions of 
transparency, outside participation, and reason giving. TUCKER, supra note 15, at 352-66; 
Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 15, 30-35; Metzger, supra note 11, at 140-42; Zaring, supra note 15, 
at 184-85. For an argument that Fed leaders and especially the Chair are conscious of how certain 
audiences judge them according to certain intellectual norms (which are admittedly evolving and 
malleable), and are thereby constrained in a manner that partly substitutes for legal constraint, 
see Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft Constraints, 78 LAW. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 65, 67-82 (2015).  
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interpretations and policies. Diversity of input improves these decisions’ 
factual and predictive accuracy, their legal thoroughness and stability, and 
thus their effectiveness in carrying out the Fed’s statutory mission.  
To be sure, transparency and openness can also have negative 
consequences that sometimes offset its advantages. We do not mean to 
fetishize the high levels of transparency and participation that have come 
to prevail—often by judicial pressure—at other agencies. The Fed is 
exceptional, and it should, in some ways, remain so. The argument is that 
administrative law offers the possibility of important cost-beneficial 
improvements in some areas. In particular, we think the net benefits of 
transparency and openness are clear when it comes to the Fed’s 
development of generally applicable legal interpretations and in its 
procedures for setting general long-term policy, such as the 2012 adoption 
of a “long-term monetary policy goal” of two-percent inflation and the 
revision of this goal in 2020 to allow for “average inflation targeting” across 
years.22  
We therefore focus our argument on those aspects of the Fed’s work. 
We do not advocate for more transparency and openness when it comes to 
the more numerous, narrow, and short-term decisions on how to 
implement prior, more general interpretations or policies. These 
implementational decisions tend to be relatively more time-sensitive, 
rendering process delays more costly. They also have short-term political 
consequences that make them less appropriate objects of public debate 
than longer-term, generally applicable agency choices. For example, we 
argue for opening up the Fed’s process for choosing its long-run inflation 
target, but not its process for making the individual month-by-month 
interest-rate decisions by which the Fed tries to keep to that target.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a new synthesis 
of the literature in administrative law and administrative governance on 
the advantages and costs of transparency and openness as relevant to 
central banking. First, we discuss the importance of agencies’ signaling how 
they plan to interpret law and exercise discretion in the future so as to 
shape the expectations and behavior of regulated parties and third 
parties—especially in contexts not subject to judicial review. Second, we 
discuss how agencies can make better factual and predictive judgments 
when basing those judgments on input from intellectually diverse players, 
whose errors and biases offset one another. An essential, though not 
always cost-effective, means of obtaining diverse input and countering 
                                                                                                             
22. To compare the original 2012 FOMC Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary 
Policy Strategy with the 2020 revision, see Review of Monetary Policy Tools, Strategies, and 
Communications, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Aug. 27, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/guide-to-changes-in-statement-on-longer-run-
goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm [https://perma.cc/V3B4-ZVBF]. 
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groupthink is to solicit information from outside the agency, such as public 
comments and outside advisory-committee recommendations. While we 
articulate a theory for greater participation for Fed decision-making, we 
do not argue for extremes. Where public participation introduces 
challenges to administrative efficacy—and it often does—we identify 
techniques for mitigating these problems.  
Part II moves to the Fed’s monetary policymaking. It describes how 
legal transparency and openness can improve monetary-policy outcomes 
during monetary regime change.23 While scholars and central bankers have 
long noted the essential role of central-bank transparency and 
communications, they have virtually ignored the roles for law and 
process—and the absence of both—in adopting long-run policies.24 The 
key example explored in Part II is perhaps the most important monetary-
policy decision in a generation: the Fed’s 2012 adoption of a numerical 
interpretation of its statutory mandate, the first such interpretation in the 
Fed’s history. A closed, internal Fed process produced the announcement 
of a numeric target for inflation alone (ignoring unemployment), set at two 
percent. Only eight years later, in August 2020, the two-percent target was 
significantly altered. Instead of targeting annual inflation of two percent, 
the Fed will now target an average inflation rate of two percent, meaning 
that it will now offset a deviation from the target in one direction in one 
year (say, inflation of 1.7% rather than two percent) with a similar 
deviation in the opposite direction in subsequent years (inflation of 2.3%, 
rather than two percent, in the next year). The rapid regime shift for the 
Fed’s “constitution” of longer-run monetary policy suggests a flawed 2012 
interpretative process.25 By adopting a more open and transparent 
interpretation process, the Fed likely would have produced a more robust 
monetary-policy goal.  
In Part III, we discuss the Fed’s use of its power to make emergency 
loans in the event of a crisis. The Federal Reserve Act confers this power 
in language that suggests sweeping discretion, but it uses a few obscure 
terms that may be read as imposing legal constraints. Using this authority 
in 2008, the Fed effected the bailout of Bear Stearns, but not Lehman 
Brothers, but then AIG and much of the rest of the financial system. Part 
                                                                                                             
23. The Fed has undergone a review of its monetary-policy regime culminating in the 
2020 change to its operational framework. See id. 
24. For an overview of discussions of transparency in monetary policy, see ALAN 
BLINDER, THE QUIET REVOLUTION: CENTRAL BANKING GOES MODERN 5-34 (2004); and N. 
Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What 
Effects 2-11 (Nat’l Bur. Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13003, 2007).         
25. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, David Wessel, & John David Murray, Rethinking 
the Fed’s 2 percent Inflation Target, BROOKINGS (June 7, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/ES_20180607_Hutchins-FedInflationTarget.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V5D7-7BBE]. 
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III traces the shifting explanations of what legal understanding underlay 
these seemingly zigzagging decisions. After tracing this history, we argue 
that a more transparent and open process for formulating and announcing 
the Fed’s understanding and planned use of the Act would be better for 
the Fed, market participants who might anticipate dependence on the Fed 
during a crisis, and the public who will later demand explanations for 
invocations of emergency authority after the fact. Transparency would 
have assisted the Fed regardless of one’s preferred interpretation of the 
Fed’s emergency-lending powers under the Federal Reserve Act.  
 
*   *   * 
 
Before we dive into our analysis, some background on the byzantine 
structure of the Federal Reserve System is necessary to orient readers. The 
Fed’s “Board of Governors” sits in Washington, D.C. and is composed of 
seven members appointed by the President, and confirmed by the Senate, 
for staggered, nonrenewable fourteen-year terms.26 The Board is formally 
an agency of the U.S. government. The System also includes twelve quasi-
private Federal Reserve Banks whose functions and authorities have 
evolved since their creation in 1914.27 Each Reserve Bank is led by a 
President appointed by that bank’s board of directors28 and approved by 
the Fed’s Board of Governors.29  
For monetary policy, the most important component of the Federal 
Reserve System is the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The 
FOMC sets a target rate for an important short-term interest rate, the 
Federal Funds rate.30 The Fed’s monetary policy is then directed towards 
achieving this target rate by changing the rate of interest the Fed pays on 
reserve balances that banks hold at the Fed.31 The Committee consists of 
twelve voting members and seven nonvoting “alternate members,” who 
still actively participate in the FOMC’s meetings. The seven members of 
                                                                                                             
26. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2018). 
27. See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 15, at 103-27 (discussing the historical evolution of 
the Federal Reserve Banks).  
28. The boards of directors of the Federal Reserve Banks are divided into three classes: 
A, B, and C. Class A directors are bankers selected by the member banks in the relevant Federal 
Reserve District; Class B directors are non-bankers—although they can be and often are former 
bankers—also selected by the member banks; Class C directors are non-bankers—although, again, 
they can be and sometimes are former bankers—selected by the Fed’s Board of Governors to 
represent the public. 12 U.S.C. § 302 (2018). 
29. Id. § 341.  
30. See Monetary Policy Principles and Practice, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE 
SYS. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/monetary-policy-what-are-
its-goals-how-does-it-work.htm [https://perma.cc/U3RH-Y94H].  
31. Id. 
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the Board of Governors and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York serve on the FOMC as permanent voting members, along with 
a rotating group of four of the remaining eleven presidents of the Federal 
Reserve Banks, a rotation that is defined by statute.32 The FOMC chooses 
its own leadership. By convention, it always chooses the Chair of the Board 
of Governors as its Chair and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York as its Vice Chair. Neither of these choices is required by 
statute.33 
Different combinations of the Board of Governors, the Federal 
Reserve Banks, and the FOMC use the Fed’s statutory authority as 
discussed in this Article. The FOMC is responsible for conducting the 
Fed’s monetary policy, although it also relies on authority granted to the 
Board of Governors to adjust its primary policy rate.34 Emergency lending 
must be authorized by a supermajority of the Board of Governors, and the 
security for each loan must be approved by whichever of the twelve 
Federal Reserve Banks actually makes the loan.35  
I. The Advantages of Central Bank Transparency and Openness 
This Part discusses two advantages that transparency and openness 
offer to agencies in their interpretation of law and in their procedures for 
long-term policymaking. First, transparency and openness enhance the 
agency’s capacity to signal credible commitments. Second, they diversify 
the input that goes into an agency’s interpretive and policy choices and can 
thereby make those choices more accurate and effective.  
A. Signaling Credible Commitment  
In implementing legislation, every agency has the power to interpret 
the ambiguities of that legislation and to exercise the discretion left it by 
the legislation. The agency can interpret law and exercise discretion in 
direct, coercive actions against regulated parties, such as by imposing 
penalties, or by denying approvals for licenses or benefits. But imposing 
penalties and denying approvals is costly, both for the regulated firms and 
the agency itself. It is more efficient for the agency to signal in advance 
how it interprets the relevant law and how it plans to exercise its 
discretion—and for the regulated firms to follow that signal accordingly, 
and to shape their own primary conduct and write their applications in a 
                                                                                                             
32. 12 U.S.C.  § 263(a). 
33. CONTI-BROWN, supra note 15, at 113. 
34. 12 U.S.C. § 461 (2018). 
35. Id. § 343. 
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manner that anticipates the agency’s interpretations and policies. 
Agencies, in fact, have published oceanic volumes of such guidance to 
make themselves more predictable to regulated parties and to shift 
regulated parties’ behavior in the direction of compliance with minimal 
friction.36 
Audiences for agency signaling go well beyond the regulated parties 
themselves. For example, they include the potential counterparties of 
those who are regulated. In some industries, agencies are in a position to 
give consumers and investors more credible signals about the safety and 
efficacy of firms’ products or services than would be feasible in an 
unregulated market.37 Conversely, agencies can credibly signal that a firm’s 
products or services have previously unseen problems, with the result, in 
some industries, that the firm suffers more from lost counterparty trust 
than from any direct agency sanctions.38  
In the Fed’s case, the audiences for signaling can be especially far-
reaching. The Fed’s open-market operations for conducting monetary 
policy entail signaling not only to the banks that transact with the Fed and 
those banks’ customers and counterparties, but to all actors in the economy 
who form expectations about inflation and economic growth based on 
what they expect the Fed to do. Similarly, the Fed’s handling of emergency 
lending entails signaling not just to regulated banks but to all actors in the 
financial system who could start or worsen a bank run if they lost 
confidence in the financial system. 
For matters like inflation and bank runs, which can be caused by 
changes in expectations, expectation management itself can determine 
regulatory success or failure, and credible signaling becomes even more 
crucial.39 Deft management of expectations can also be decisive when it 
comes to emergency lending. Such lending aims to stave off a crisis, yet its 
very availability may encourage firms to take excessive risks that bring on 
the crisis. Conversely, a credible signal that the central bank will not bail 
out such firms can induce them to be more careful ex ante, such that a crisis 
                                                                                                             
36. NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, FEDERAL AGENCY GUIDANCE: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 28-37 
(2017).  
37. Daniel Carpenter, Confidence Games: How Does Regulation Constitute Markets?, 
in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 181 (Edward J. 
Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010) (arguing that Food and Drug Administration regulation 
was necessary to the emergence of a market for high-investment drugs).  
38. Jonathan M. Karpoff, Does Reputation Work to Discipline Corporate Misconduct?, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 372-73 (Timothy G. Pollock & 
Michael L. Barnett eds., 2012).  
39. On inflation and signaling, see Reis, supra note 15, at 33-36.  
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never comes.40 Managing expectations, then, in an important sense defines 
the work of central banking. 
How can the Fed credibly signal its future action? At first glance, one 
might think that “law” connotes stability, so that if an agency wants to 
signal credible commitment to do (or not do) some act, it should simply 
announce that it interprets its statute to require (or prohibit) the act. But 
it is not so simple. Interpretations of law can change. If an agency says it 
reads its statute a certain way, whether in deciding an individual matter or 
in a more general announcement (known as an “interpretive rule”), the 
agency will not be bound by that interpretation indefinitely. It can renege 
on that reading so long as (1) the new reading is reasonable (whether or 
not the old interpretation was also reasonable) and (2) the agency gives 
enough of a reason for shifting to the new reading that its departure is not 
arbitrary or capricious.41 There is no per se bar to reneging, and some 
agencies are famous for doing it. “It is a fact of life in [National Labor 
Relations Board] lore,” says one eminent judge, “that certain substantive 
provisions of the [National Labor Relations Act] invariably fluctuate with 
the changing compositions of the Board.”42  
Even if agency legal interpretation were stickier than it is, there would 
still be the problem that much agency action is not driven by interpretation 
at all, but instead consists of the agency’s choices of how to exercise 
discretion left it by law. The Federal Reserve Act is filled with such grants 
of discretionary authority in both monetary policy and emergency lending. 
This is not uncommon in the administrative state: when an agency 
publishes guidance, it frequently includes both interpretations of law and 
projections for how it will exercise discretion, often imperceptibly mixed.43  
An agency’s commitments, whether they involve legal interpretation 
or projections about exercising discretion, are strongest when the agency 
                                                                                                             
40. Charles W. Calomiris, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, R. Glenn Hubbard, Allen H. Meltzer & 
Hal S. Scott, Establishing Credible Rules for Fed Emergency Lending, 9 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 260, 
261 (2017).  
41. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209 (2015) (recognizing agency 
power to rescind an interpretive rule without notice and comment); FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations 556 U.S. 502, 513-14 (2009) (applying the arbitrary-or-capricious standard to an agency 
shift between two interpretations of a statute). Agencies must consider reliance on the old view 
but need not give it dispositive weight. DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1914 
(2020); Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515-16. Note the shift may be more difficult if the previous 
interpretation was challenged and upheld in a court that is a proper venue for challenges to the 
new interpretation. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 
(2005).  
42. Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
43. BLAKE EMERSON & RONALD M. LEVIN, AGENCY GUIDANCE THROUGH 
INTERPRETIVE RULES: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 9-12 (2019).  
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makes reneging costly for itself. Scholars of administrative law have 
identified two principal mechanisms for doing this.44 The first is for the 
agency to have its legal interpretation challenged and upheld in litigation, 
giving it the status of judicial precedent that can be invoked in litigation 
against any future departure.45 The second is for the agency to commit to 
certain interpretations or plans for exercising discretion by enshrining 
them in a legislative rule, adopted through notice and comment.46 A 
legislative rule is binding law. A plaintiff with standing can sue to force the 
agency to follow it.47 And such a rule can be rescinded only by a subsequent 
legislative rule that must itself go through notice and comment. The 
legislative rulemaking process is prolonged: typically five years to develop 
the proposal prior to the notice, then typically one year to receive 
comments and promulgate the final rule.48 Also the process is extremely 
costly in funding and staff, meaning an agency can only make so many rules 
in a given period. Announcing an approach through a legislative rule is a 
credible commitment to stick with that approach for at least a few years 
and likely indefinitely.  
While these two mechanisms may be effective for many agencies in 
many contexts, they are unlikely to be the right option for the Fed in most 
of its big-ticket activities. Note that both mechanisms depend on there 
being judicial review. The first mechanism simply is judicial review, applied 
to legal interpretations. And the second mechanism depends on judicial 
review indirectly: judicial review is the means to ensure that an agency 
follows its own legislative rules. More subtly, the threat of judicial review 
                                                                                                             
44. Besides studies discussing how an agency can credibly commit, many studies analyze 
the separate question—not a focus of this Article—of how a legislature’s delegation of power to 
an agency can serve as a means for the legislature to credibly commit. Indeed, many of these 
studies discuss Congress and the Fed and are cited in our earlier references on the Fed and 
separation of powers. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Separately, Nou considers the 
credibility of an agency head’s commitment to subordinate officials that certain powers will 
remain subdelegated to those officials. Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 
473, 496-511 (2017).  
45. Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 60 
VAND. L. REV. 1021 (2007). But as Masur emphasizes, this commitment mechanism is diminished 
by Brand X, which allows agencies to depart from statutory interpretations adopted by courts if 
the statute is ambiguous and if the agency adopts its new interpretation through procedures 
deserving of deference. 545 U.S. at 982.  
46. Nina A Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before 
a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 589-99 (2003); Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky 
Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 116 (2018).  
47. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 872-82 
(2009).  
48. RACHEL AUGUSTINE POTTER, BENDING THE RULES: PROCEDURAL POLITICKING 
IN THE BUREAUCRACY 33, 137-38 (2019).  
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of a rule is also what forces the agency to go through such a laborious 
process in adopting one.49  
As we discuss elsewhere, the Fed—in contrast to most agencies—is 
unlikely to face judicial review for its highest-stakes activities or for 
general legal interpretations or policymaking concerning those activities. 
This is due to standing problems in the case of monetary policy50 and 
timing and other problems in the case of emergency lending.51 
Can an agency make credible commitments regarding matters for 
which it is not subject to judicial review and judicially enforced legislative-
rulemaking requirements? Empirically, yes. Industry lawyers consider “no 
action” letters from the Securities and Exchange Commission—issued in 
the thousands since the mid-twentieth century—to be highly valuable 
sources of “law.” The Commission has apparently never proceeded against 
a party who acted in good faith on a letter’s advice, even though it is likely 
no court could stop the agency from doing so.52 Notice-and-comment 
processes have been institutionalized at the Department of Health and 
Human Services and at the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development since the 1970s. It was during this time that those two 
agencies adopted procedures for taking comment from stakeholders on all 
legislative rules, at much cost, even though both agencies are statutorily 
exempt from any requirement to follow such procedures for rules relating 
to benefits or grants and could lawfully rescind the procedures anytime.53  
At the Department of Justice, advice on the legality of executive-
branch action has been internally vested since the 1950s in the Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC). The Carter Administration established a norm of 
treating OLC as independent and court-like and deferring to its view on 
high-stakes questions as “a signaling mechanism” to broadcast its 
                                                                                                             
49. When agencies voluntarily undertake notice and comment in adopting nonbinding 
guidance, their process is formally similar to legislative rulemaking but far less time-consuming 
and costly because the absence of judicial review means they do not feel the need to build up a 
mountain of evidence and defenses for the document. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Should the Public Get 
to Participate Before Federal Agencies Issue Guidance? An Empirical Study 71 ADMIN L. REV. 
57, 82-84 (2019) [hereinafter Parrillo, Should the Public Get to Participate].  
50. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
51. See infra Section III.F.  
52. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical 
Study of Agencies and Industries 36 YALE J. REG. 165, 267 (2019) [hereinafter Parrillo, Power to 
Bind].  
53. JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW 
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 684-85 (7th ed. 2014). Indeed, another agency with a similar 
procedure dating to 1971 (the Department of Agriculture) did rescind it in 2013. Id. at 685. 
Rescission of an agency-created procedure could be subject to judicial review, but that review is 
unlikely to be searching like it is for legislative rules, as the agency need not take comments or 
respond to comments when adopting or rescinding a procedure. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018).  
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“commitment to comply with law.”54 This norm remained strong in the 
Bush Administration, when numerous high DOJ officials were prepared 
to resign if the President defied OLC’s view,55 even though there was no 
legal requirement that he adhere to it.56  
These examples suggest that an agency can credibly commit to an 
approach absent judicial review and legislative rulemaking, but the 
question remains: how does the agency do it? Here we identify three 
possible aspects of an agency communication—whether an interpretation 
of law or a plan for exercising discretion—that can make it more costly for 
the agency to renege on the communication and therefore more credible 
that the agency’s future conduct will match what the communication said. 
Agency officials can deliberately strengthen and leverage all these aspects 
to make their commitments stronger.  
1. Realistic Contingency Planning  
Other things equal, a commitment stated in objective, rigid terms is 
more credible than one stated in vague, loose terms. The reason is that 
violations of an objective, rigid commitment are easier to identify and 
harder to obfuscate, meaning that whatever bad consequences other 
parties can impose on the agency for violations (more on those later) will 
hit more certainly when the commitment’s terms are objective and rigid.57 
There is a tradeoff, though: as a commitment grows more objective and 
rigid, it tends to become cruder and less realistic, against the background 
of uncertainty about future challenges the agency may face. The 
crudeness—and the lack of candor, integrity, and intellectual seriousness 
it connotes—diminishes credibility. A statement that says “we will never 
bail out another bank, ever” is clear, objective, crude, and noncredible.  
To reap credibility from objective terms, an agency should engage in 
specific contingency planning: it should identify possible future states of 
the world and assign to each state a plan of action that is as rigid and 
                                                                                                             
54. Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805, 866 (2017).  
55. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ET AL., 
UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 27 (2009). 
However, the credibility of OLC and of the executive branch’s commitment to follow OLC 
diminished over the course of the Bush and Obama administrations. Renan, supra note 54, at 842-
46, 866-67.  
56. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT IN THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 79 (2007).  
57. In the context of inflation targeting, see Alberto Alesina & Andrea Stella, The 
Politics of Monetary Policy, in 3B HANDBOOK OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 1001, 1007 (2011). In 
jurisprudence, see Frederick Schauer, Official Obedience and the Politics of Defining “Law,” 86 
S. CAL L. REV. 1165, 1190, 1192 (2013).  
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objective as possible without seeming overly crude or unrealistic.58 When 
an agency knows more about a possible future state, it can provide more 
evidence and arguments for why a specific course of action will be suitable 
for it. For other future states, about which less is known, the agency is 
justified in adopting a looser approach, as a more rigid one would not be 
credible anyway.  
To remain realistic, an agency must update its contingency plans to 
take account of new information. This includes the discovery of new 
possible future states, as well as new information about which approaches 
are best-suited to known possible future states.59 To be sure, the periodic 
revision of the plans diminishes their perceived stability. However, a stated 
intellectual framework for the use of new evidence can mitigate that 
problem by showing that plans are evolving in a rational and 
understandable manner.  
2. Staking the Reputations of Officials and the Agency 
Officials in many agencies are members of professions, including law, 
economics, medicine, and the sciences. A profession’s training 
requirements and career patterns are structured to give each member a 
lifelong stake in the profession.60 While we stereotypically think of 
advancement within a career as being vertical (up the ladder of a 
hierarchical organization), advancement within a professional career is 
often, to a large degree, horizontal, in the sense of “an increase in 
reputation or prestige based on expertise” judged by one’s peers.61 To a 
professional, reputation is therefore a prized asset. Professionals tacitly 
lend their reputations as hostages for the accuracy of judgments they 
make.62 This dynamic operates powerfully within agencies. According to 
one leading study, an agency tends to make more accurate predictive 
judgments (notwithstanding political pressure for inaccurately optimistic 
judgments) if it has less personnel turnover, apparently because low 
turnover makes inaccurate judgments easier to trace back to the 
                                                                                                             
58. Two recent analyses of central-bank emergency lending contain brief discussions 
along the same lines. TUCKER, supra note 15, at 512; Calomiris, Holtz-Eakin, Hubbard, Meltzer 
& Scott, supra note 40, at 261. For a more in-depth discussion in the context of monetary policy, 
see Alesina & Stella, supra note 57, at 1007-13.  
59. TUCKER, supra note 15, at 120 (“Good (within-regime) contingency planning shift 
out the boundary between the normal and the exceptional, and the period following a crisis should 
be used to fill in gaps in those plans as lessons are learned.”).  
60. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC 101-02 (2001).  
61. Id. at 76.  
62. Miguel Alzola, Beware of the Watchdog: Rethinking the Normative Justification of 
Gatekeeper Liability, 140 J. BUS. ETHICS 705, 707 (2017) (citing Oliver Williamson, Credible 
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983)).  
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individuals who made them.63 Staking one’s reputation has a disciplining 
effect on behavior.  
Now imagine that an official publicly originates or endorses a certain 
agency approach to a problem, such as a contingency plan or set of such 
plans, or an intellectual framework for developing those plans. In doing so, 
the official stakes his or her reputation on it. If that official later abandons 
the approach, it amounts to an admission of error, with a corresponding 
reputational hit. Ex ante, observers who know that officials have staked 
their reputations on a certain approach will view the officials’ commitment 
to that approach as more credible.  
Officials wishing to commit credibly to an approach can do so by 
endorsing it, transparently and openly, in a manner that stakes their 
professional competence. For instance, officials might offer their expert 
evaluation of the arguments and evidence for or against the approach. This 
can be done in venues like congressional testimony, public meetings, 
speeches, academic papers, or signed agency publications, including 
responses to public comments.  
We have explained these dynamics in terms of an individual official, 
but they can also operate at the level of a whole agency, or one of its 
components. A group that has staked its reputation on a decision is loath 
to reverse itself. Contrary to the widespread perception of the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) as risk-averse, the agency is slow and skittish 
in deciding not only whether to approve drugs but also whether to pull 
them from the market after approval. This pattern does not make sense if 
the agency is risk-averse about safety, but it does make sense if the agency 
is protecting against risk to its own reputation.64 As one FDA official told 
the Senate in 2004, the FDA office “that approved the drug in the first 
place and that regards it as its own child, typically proves to be the single 
greatest obstacle to effectively dealing with serious drug safety issues.”65 
Agencies concerned about reputation tend to “keep their options open” 
and “avoid commitment to a hypothesis that can be publicly falsified,” but 
then, when they do bite the bullet and make decisions, they often treat 
those decisions as “irreversible.”66 Relatedly, officials risk-averse about 
their reputations will tend to follow approaches already adopted by the 
                                                                                                             
63. George A. Krause & J. Kevin Corder, Explaining Bureaucratic Optimism: Theory 
and Evidence from U.S. Executive Agency Macroeconomic Forecasts, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
129 (2007).  
64. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 626-27 (2010).  
65. Id. at 630 (quoting the testimony of one agency official before Congress).  
66. Daniel P. Carpenter & George A. Krause, Reputation and Public Administration, 72 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 26, 29 (2012). 
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agency; this is because following established protocol diffuses blame for 
bad consequences that might arise from any given action.67 Blame falls not 
only on the official taking action but on all prior officials who originated 
or maintained the protocol. 
When the commitment is to a certain interpretation of law, the 
primary professional reputation at stake is that of agency lawyers. But it is 
not lawyers’ reputations alone: nonlawyer officials with substantive 
program expertise are and should be involved in interpreting the agency’s 
statutes. That is because agencies should interpret their statutes to fulfill 
the broad policy objectives for which Congress enacted them, not 
necessarily follow the most ordinary meaning of statutory text. According 
to one classic work on this method, the interpreter should read a statute 
“so as to carry out [its] purpose as best it can,” so long as the interpreter 
does “not give the words . . . a meaning they will not bear.”68 While scholars 
of statutory interpretation have fought bitterly with one another over 
whether this policy-driven approach (as opposed to a literalist approach) 
is right for courts, those same scholars have achieved strikingly wide 
agreement that policy-driven interpretation is right for agencies.69 And if 
interpretation is driven by policy, then policy experts (and not just lawyers) 
should be involved.  
                                                                                                             
67. CHRISTOPHER HOOD, THE BLAME GAME: SPIN, BUREAUCRACY, AND SELF-
PRESERVATION IN GOVERNMENT 93-100 (2011). 
68. HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William Eskridge & Philip Frickey eds., Foundation 
Press 1994) (1958).  
69. William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron's Domain: A Comparative Institutional 
Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. 
REV. 411; Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89; Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A 
Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501 (2005); Kevin 
M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, NW. U. L. REV. 
871 (2015); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to 
Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 
321 (1990). Prominent academic proponents of the literalist (textualist) approach for courts do 
not seek to impose that method on agencies. On the contrary, some of them wholeheartedly accept 
the alternative, policy-driven approach for agencies. Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in 
Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2004); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 207-15 (2006). 
Another has come near to the question a couple of times only to reemphasize his commitment to 
judicial textualism without pronouncing on agency methods. John F. Manning, Why Does 
Congress Vote on Some Texts but Not Others? 51 TULSA L. REV. 559, 573 n.84 (2015); John F. 
Manning, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1548 (2014). The most 
developed dissenting view is that of Richard Pierce, who warns that, insofar as the judiciary is 
relatively textualist, a different agency method will lead to conflict, in which agencies will end up 
losers. Richard J. Pierce Jr., How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They 
Administer: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (2007). But that warning 
becomes less applicable when agency action is reviewed less by courts. 
 
Yale Journal on Regulation   Vol. 38:1, 2021 
20 
 
3. Building a Coalition of External Interests 
An agency’s commitment to its approach is more credible when 
external actors support it and can be expected to resist if the agency tries 
to renege.70 Such external actors can include congressional overseers,71 
international regulatory bodies,72 and interest groups. There are many 
possible reasons for interest groups to get behind a particular agency 
approach. They may be direct beneficiaries of the approach. They may 
have made specific investments in reliance on the approach’s 
continuance.73 Or they may view the approach as creating a level playing 
field among themselves and their competitors, meaning they will resist any 
variation as putting them at an unfair competitive disadvantage.74  
The agency can harness these diverse pressures as commitment 
devices by inviting support and reliance from external actors, and also by 
identifying external actors who benefit from the agency’s approach, 
notifying them about it, and helping them organize.75 It may be especially 
possible to build a coalition of diverse interests if the agency is adopting a 
process or an intellectual framework for choosing policies; groups of 
political actors have been known to stick by a common process even when 
each of them dislikes some of the particular outcomes that result from it.76 
 
*   *   * 
 
We close this Section by noting that there is a tradeoff between the 
good incentive effects of agency credible commitment on regulated entities 
                                                                                                             
70. This is a central point of the literature on “policy feedback,” which mostly concerns 
legislatively enacted policies but also applies to agency-chosen policies. See Suzanne Mettler & 
Mallory Sorelle, Policy Feedback Theory, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 103, 110-12 
(Christopher M. Weible & Paul A. Sabatier eds., 4th ed. 2018); ERIC PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT 
RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ARE ENACTED 29-30, 176-77 (2008).  
71. Michael Herz, The Attorney Particular: Governmental Role of the Agency General 
Counsel, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND 
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 143, 150-56 (Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995) [hereinafter Herz, Attorney 
Particular]; Tess Bridgeman & Ryan Goodman, Unpacking the State Dept Acknowledgment that 
2001 and 2002 AUMFs Don’t Authorize War Against Iran, JUST SECURITY (July 3, 2019), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/64807/unpacking-the-state-dept-acknowledgment-that-2001-and-
2002-aumfs-dont-authorize-war-against-iran/ [https://perma.cc/NBQ7-F5WQ]. 
72. Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 
Yale L.J. 400, 453-54 (2015) (citing, inter alia, the Fed and the Basel Accords).  
73. PATASHNIK, supra note 70, at 177.  
74. Parrillo, Power to Bind, supra note 52, at 232-37.  
75. See Nou, supra note 44, at 502-03 (discussing how agency transparency about internal 
policies can help mobilize external actors against those policies’ rescission).  
76. Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 692-97. 
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and third parties, on the one hand, and the loss of agency flexibility to 
adjust to unforeseen circumstances, on the other. The more predictable the 
agency’s approach, the more inflexible it is, and vice versa. The exact 
balance for navigating this tradeoff will be context specific. For now, we 
simply caution that the discourse on governance tends to assign too much 
value to flexibility and too little value to advance planning, with the 
opportunities it provides for calmer and better deliberation and greater 
stability.77  
B. Diversity of Input  
For most federal agencies, openness manifests primarily as public 
participation—a variety of procedures for members of the public to 
provide input on agency decisions. The most elaborate of these 
procedures, and the most analyzed in the scholarship, is notice and 
comment for adopting legislative rules, complete with an agency response 
to comments upon adopting the final rule. In addition, agencies frequently 
establish advisory committees with members from outside the agency, 
including interest-group representatives and academics. These committees 
help agencies make decisions by holding public meetings and hearings, 
publishing committee reports, and soliciting agency responses. Less 
formally, an agency may organize one-shot events for seeking input, like 
stakeholder meetings, listening sessions, workshops, and webinars, or it 
may communicate one-on-one with selected stakeholders, openly or 
privately. All these techniques can be employed in the process for 
legislative rulemaking, on top of notice and comment. Agencies can also 
use each for lesser agency decisions, like nonbinding guidance. Indeed, 
agencies adopting guidance sometimes go through “rulemaking lite” 
beforehand, which is like the notice-and-comment process for legislative 
rulemaking, except the agency does not produce as much explanation or 
evidence.78 
1. Advantages of Public Participation  
The academic literature offers two main reasons why public 
participation can be good. The first is epistemic: outside input helps the 
agency make more instrumentally rational decisions by providing it better 
                                                                                                             
77. David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1411-17, 1445-52 
(2011).  
78. Parrillo, Should the Public Get to Participate, supra note 49, at 270. The White House 
recently required this procedure for a large category of guidance documents at all executive 
agencies, a group that does not include the Fed. Exec. Order No. 13891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 
9, 2019).  
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information on which to base factual and predictive judgments. The second 
reason is that public participation increases agency action’s legitimacy as a 
social fact: participation makes the action more acceptable to the regulated 
industry and the public.79 We are agnostic about whether greater openness 
to public participation will increase the legitimacy of the Fed’s actions.80 
But there is a strong case that such openness benefits the Fed epistemically. 
More outside input can help the Fed make more accurate factual and 
predictive judgments and thus be more effective in carrying out its mission.  
A large body of research in psychology, management, and related 
disciplines finds that diversity in the information and intellectual 
perspectives that individuals hold regarding a problem makes them more 
capable of addressing that problem as a collective. “[A]lthough individuals 
are prone to error,” says a recent review of this literature, “multiple 
perspectives yield diverse errors that statistically offset each other.”81 
Further, “the more diverse knowledge of the group as opposed to any 
given individual . . . allows for a fuller understanding of a given decision.” 
The research finds that “individuals tend to hold a narrow but 
overconfident view of their judgments,” and “[s]pecialization and 
expertise add an additional obstacle.”82 Expertise “draws attention to 
certain features of a problem, but can blind someone to other features.”83 
There is thus an advantage to having “different, complementary areas of 
expertise, all of which are relevant and necessary to making the best 
decisions” for organization-level outcomes.84  
Consistent with this, the most comprehensive meta-analysis of studies 
of the diversity of work groups in industry workplaces finds that job-
                                                                                                             
79. For a recent articulation of these two justifications, see Michael A. Livermore, 
Vladimir Eidelman & Brian Grom, Computationally Assisted Rulemaking Participation, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 977, 982-86 (2018).  
80. Although it is well documented that a government decision-maker can use procedure 
(including transparency, participation, and reason giving) to increase the acceptance of targeted 
adjudicatory and enforcement decisions among directly affected individuals, there is much less 
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on both types of acceptance, see generally E. Allan Lind & Christiane Arndt, Perceived Fairness 
and Regulatory Policy (OECD, Regulatory Policy Working Paper No. 6, 2016). For a forceful 
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are legal, see Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 369-89 (2019).  
81. Richard P. Larrick, The Social Context of Decisions, 3 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. ORG. 
BEHAV. 441, 445 (2016).  
82. Id. 
83. Id.  
84. Id. For another review of this literature, reaching similar conclusions, see CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE GROUPS 
SMARTER 21-102 (2014).  
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related diversity in work groups relates positively to the group’s 
performance in complex tasks. The authors think this result is most likely 
explained by “the nature of the informational differences with which job-
related diversity . . . is associated”—that is, people doing different jobs can 
offer different kinds of information.85  
An organization seeking diversity’s advantages faces a variety of 
challenges,86 of which the most relevant for the Fed is the danger that 
agreement will be too easy and premature, leading to bad decisions. This 
danger in group decision-making was originally identified by Irving Janis 
in his studies of “groupthink” in the 1970s and 1980s. Drawing from case 
studies of high-level U.S. national-security decision-making, Janis found 
that, under certain conditions, members of a group would overestimate the 
group’s likelihood of success in making decisions. They would rationalize 
away and conceal their private doubts.87 Thus the organization would fail 
to consider the downsides of their choice, fail to identify and analyze 
enough alternatives, and fail to take seriously incoming information 
counseling against that choice.88 All this raises the risk of wrong judgments.  
Subsequent work has clarified and reinforced the dangers of 
groupthink. Reviewing experimental research in the generation since 
Janis, Robert Baron finds groupthink’s irrationally close-minded process 
can operate whenever members (a) identify with the group, (b) face a 
highly complex problem, and (c) receive a signal, early in the decision-
making process, of some outcome toward which the group might gravitate. 
Such a signal could arise from a preexisting paradigm or value system 
shared among the members, or from a leader who, early in the deliberation 
process, suggests what conclusion she wants.89  
Janis’s essential and enduring insight is that decision-makers often 
irrationally incline toward consensus, and they thereby fail to find and 
exploit diverse information that could lead to more accurate predictions 
                                                                                                             
85. Hans Van Dijk et al., Defying Conventional Wisdom: A Meta-analytical 
Examination of the Differences Between Demographic and Job-Related Diversity Relationships 
with Performance, 119 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 38, 49 (2012).  
86. These include organizational insiders’ emotional attachments to preexisting ideas in 
the face of challenge. See Larrick, supra note 81, at 448-49; Katherine J. Klein & David A. 
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88. Id. at 9-10, 245.  
89. Robert S. Baron, So Right It’s Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of 
Polarized Group Decisionmaking, 37 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 228-33, 
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information); SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 84, at 57-88 (discussing the topics of cascades and 
polarization).  
 
Yale Journal on Regulation   Vol. 38:1, 2021 
24 
 
and judgments. Skepticism and dissent—and organizational norms and 
procedures to ensure dissenting views are not prematurely quashed—are 
important to guard against this. As one literature review says, “Teams are 
much more likely to find the correct solution if they have a group norm to 
be critical rather than to seek consensus.”90 According to another review, 
groups with “norms of critical dissent” are “less likely to fall in the trap of 
focusing on shared information at the expense of unshared information,” 
leading to “improved decision quality.”91  
Groupthink at the Fed has been recognized as a risk. Two former Fed 
Governors—Democrat-appointed Alan Blinder and Republican-
appointed Kevin Warsh—have each suggested that Janis’s work is 
applicable to the FOMC. In particular, Blinder has said the FOMC should 
be designed to take advantage of “different methods of analysis,” 
“different ways of processing information,” and “different decision 
heuristics.”92 He notes that former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan’s autocratic 
leadership encouraged groupthink and that “having only PhD 
macroeconomists on the [FOMC] may not be the best recipe.”93 These 
macroeconomists rely on a single dominant methodology, “dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium” (DSGE) modeling,94 making groupthink 
more likely. Similarly, Warsh says “diverse experiences” are helpful for the 
Committee; he also believes that the FOMC has “certain institutional 
aspects” that “differ somewhat from best practice,” including members’ 
disinclination to dissent.95 That said, Blinder and Warsh both confine their 
discussions narrowly to the FOMC: its size, meeting style, voting 
procedures, and membership. Neither discusses the Fed more broadly—
including the Board staff composition and the Reserve Bank structure—
                                                                                                             
90. Larrick, supra note 81, at 451.  
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the Fed’s activities beyond monetary policy, or the FOMC’s exchanges 
with anyone outside the Committee.96 
While more diverse intellectual backgrounds within the FOMC—or 
the Fed more generally—might be salutary, a larger shift in that direction 
depends on the vagaries of Presidential appointment, Senate confirmation, 
and the opaque selection process for the Reserve Bank presidents (who 
are now frequently long-serving Fed career officials subject to the slow 
civil-service pipeline).97 But greater outside input has advantages of its own 
and may, in any event, be the Fed’s only feasible way of immediately 
countering groupthink. This is consistent with Janis’s recommendations in 
the national-security context. Janis believed the decision-making group 
should receive input from as far outside its own boundaries as possible, 
bringing in “outside experts” who are “not core members of the policy-
making group” to “challenge the views of the core members.”98  
In fact, agency processes for public participation—for soliciting, 
receiving, and considering input from outside the agency—can be a 
powerful means to increase the agency’s diversity of information and 
counteract groupthink. Administrative-law scholar Cynthia Farina and 
psychologist Jeffrey Rachlinski have made this point about the notice-and-
comment process for rulemaking, which they argue can counter “expert 
myopia and overconfidence.”99 Political scientist Susan Moffitt makes a 
similar point with regard to advisory committees, finding that such 
committees can and do provide “task-specific diverse expertise,” such that 
“diverse perspectives and diverse cognitive heuristics render suboptimal 
policy decisions less likely.”100 And while the law sometimes requires 
agencies to use advisory committees, agencies often use them voluntarily 
to improve their understanding and strengthen their credibility with 
congressional and stakeholder audiences.101  
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Scholarship applying the psychology of group decision-making to 
public participation within agencies, however, has focused less on the 
effects of diverse perspectives coming from outside agencies than on 
diverse perspectives within agencies. In some ways, extra-agency diversity 
might be less helpful than intra-agency diversity, in that groups have a 
tendency to be more hostile to criticism coming from outside than from 
within.102 Yet this hostility can diminish if the inside officials and the 
outside critics share some common identity—for example, if the critics are 
not Fed officials but still members of the same profession—a common 
objective, or simply a norm of openness.103 And even if diversity from 
outside is inferior to diversity from within, it may be the agency’s only 
chance at diversity’s benefits if the officials inside are intellectually 
homogeneous. While there are various means of promoting critical 
thought even among homogeneous officials—Janis suggested designating 
a devil’s advocate104—later research has shown that people facing a devil’s 
advocate do not think as hard or generate as many alternatives as those 
facing someone who has been motivated to come forward by genuine 
disagreement.105 
Moreover, in other ways, diverse information held on the outside may 
be more beneficial than internal diversity. First, insiders may care more 
about respecting an organization’s hierarchy or maintaining its cohesion 
than about disclosing doubts.106 Outsiders, or those sitting on outside 
committees, would not have these qualms. Second, a key downside to 
diversity is that it can produce personal conflict; organizations need to 
keep differences from getting personal.107 If disagreement simultaneously 
provides valuable information and provokes officials’ anger or insecurity, 
it may be easier for officials to get usable information from a disagreement 
if they do not work with dissenters on a daily basis.108  
Though our discussion above focuses on the benefits of diverse input 
for factual or predictive questions (e.g., how announcing an inflation target 
will affect prices), we contend that these benefits also extend to legal 
interpretation (e.g., whether an inflation target is consistent with the 
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Federal Reserve Act’s dual mandate).109 When federal agencies answer 
general high-stakes legal questions, taking outside input is common and 
arguably the norm. In the notice-and-comment process required for 
legislative rulemaking, it is “common if not routine for comments to 
address purely interpretive issues and for agencies to consider [those 
comments] seriously” in deciding upon the final rule.110 Even when 
adopting “interpretive rules”—rules that only interpret preexisting law but 
create no new legal obligations, and therefore need not go through notice 
and comment—eight of eleven federal agencies recently surveyed 
voluntarily took public comment “on at least some” of their interpretive 
rules, and for at least six of these, the process took the form of seeking 
comments before adopting their rules.111 
Agencies have excellent reasons to take input on legal questions. 
One, of course, is that they anticipate judicial review. When facing a 
possible court challenge, agency counsel’s analyses are the kind of 
predictive judgments on which psychology literature focuses: the 
judgments assess the risk that a future event will occur—that is, a court 
ruling invalidating the agency’s action.112  
Even when judicial review is absent, as it often is for the Fed, agency 
legal interpretations still benefit from outside input. While there is an 
unfortunate dearth of scholarship on the duty of agency counsel, especially 
where courts do not tread,113 we contend that the duty has two main 
elements: agency counsel should interpret law (1) to carry out the agency’s 
statutory mission but (2) according to some understanding of the relevant 
legal sources (including the enabling act) that falls within some broad 
mainstream of what members of the legal profession examining those 
sources would consider reasonable.114 Each of these two elements can 
benefit from diverse input.  
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As to the first, agency statutory interpretation should be, to a large 
extent, policy implementation. As noted earlier, there is a striking level of 
agreement among otherwise divided scholars of statutory interpretation 
that agencies can and should interpret their enabling acts to carry out 
Congress’s broad policy objectives, even if that means not always following 
the text’s most ordinary meaning.115 Thus, the agency must understand the 
statute’s broad objectives and reason instrumentally toward the best 
means of achieving those goals. This imports much policy and factual 
analysis into the interpretive task. It also means that interpretation is the 
province not only of the agency’s lawyers but also its program officials—
and by extension, all outside parties who possess diverse knowledge about 
how actors will respond to the agency’s actions.  
The second element of agency counsel’s interpretive duty—to follow 
an analysis of the legal sources that is “mainstream” broadly defined—is 
more purely legal and less policy-oriented. The values served are not 
Congress’s melioristic policy objectives but instead “rule-of-law” values, 
especially predictability,116 which operates at two levels. One is 
predictability as to what the agency can or cannot do, which is important 
for firms and individuals making decisions whose consequences the agency 
can affect. The other level of predictability is more general. It is the 
assurance that Congress’s stated choices about the allocation of power to 
agencies will be honored,117 which in turn allows participants in the 
political and electoral system to discern which decisions are made by 
whom, strengthening government actors’ political accountability.118  
Given the importance of this purely legal, predictability-enhancing 
element of the agency’s interpretive duty, how is it to be carried out? The 
relevant sources may be different from those needed for the policy-
oriented element. They are more likely to consist of statutory text and 
structure, terms of art, legislative history, administrative precedent, or 
canons of construction, and they are less likely to be scientific theory and 
data. Yet openness to diverse input is no less crucial for finding, analyzing, 
and integrating these distinctly legal sources. This is because the raison 
                                                                                                             
115. See supra text and accompanying note 69. 
116. Predictability is central to conceptions of the rule of law applied by scholars of 
administrative law. E.g., Kevin M. Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in 
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117. Stack, supra note 116, at 1994-2002. 
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d’etre, predictability, depends on keeping the agency’s interpretation 
within the broad mainstream of collective professional understanding—of 
what firms, individuals, and their lawyers think these legal sources mean. 
If law’s function is partly to foster predictability, then agency 
interpretation should be social, in the sense of engaging with the 
community enough to avoid reading the agency’s authority unreasonably 
broadly or narrowly. Community engagement fosters predictability 
directly, by letting outsiders identify for the agency what they consider the 
provisions, precedents, history, and arguments relevant to interpretation. 
This prevents the agency from forming its conclusion while missing or 
ignoring something important. Engagement also ensures predictability 
indirectly, in that it has a disciplining effect on agency officials ex ante. If 
officials know their legal analysis will be publicly scrutinized, they will feel 
reputational incentives to make their analyses broadly acceptable to wide 
professional audiences. As one scholar notes, “[D]isclosure protects 
against fringe [legal] views.”119  
These two factors—diverse predecision input and wide public 
scrutiny—essentially describe the mechanism of accountability that our 
system employs for unelected judges on courts of last resort, who occupy a 
position conceptually similar to agency counsel whose decisions will not be 
reviewed in litigation.120 This accountability mechanism requires that high-
court judges receive adversary input ex ante, take public responsibility for 
their reasoning, and subject it to public scrutiny ex post.121  
2. Pitfalls of Public Participation and Ways to Mitigate Them  
Despite these benefits, there are several ways public participation can 
go wrong, either failing to serve its epistemic purpose or imposing 
unjustified costs on the agency. Some of these pitfalls are inherent to 
agencies; they need to be mitigated through institutional design or, if 
unavoidable, must be included in the calculus of whether and how to seek 
participation. Others are caused or aggravated by certain perversities of 
judicial review, meaning that an agency relatively insulated from litigation 
should worry about them less.  
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a. The Agency Opens Itself to Outside Input but Only from 
Familiar Sources  
There is a natural temptation to hide from feedback that makes 
decision-making more complex and difficult, even if it promises greater 
accuracy in the end. The notice-and-comment process that the APA and 
the judiciary have imposed on legislative rulemaking does not let officials 
hide. Officials must solicit ideas from the general public and “take all 
comers”—that is, receive and respond to all significant comments anybody 
sends.  
Notice and comment has many costs, however, and agencies may 
reasonably prefer to rely upon a select group of outsiders, such as an 
advisory committee. Yet relying upon a select group of outsiders may allow 
the agency to choose only the “outsiders” who think like each other and 
think like the agency. Indeed, an advisory committee lacking intellectual 
diversity can suffer from its own internal groupthink.122 
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) regulates the use of 
advisory committees at most agencies. The Federal Reserve System is not 
one of these agencies,123 but FACA and agency practices operating under 
FACA can serve as possible models for the Fed. The statute requires a 
committee’s membership to be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of 
view represented.”124 At EPA’s Science Advisory Board (SAB)—an 
overarching committee that creates and reviews offshoot committees 
advising the EPA125—board members themselves must have “ability to 
integrate and cross-connect disciplines.”126 The SAB’s offshoot 
committees should further “[c]ollectively . . . include a wide range of 
scientific and technical disciplines,” such that the “mix of such 
committees” will “foster diverse perspectives.”127  
Another model for using outside committees can be found in the 
National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine. The National 
Academies form ad hoc “study committees” of experts to write reports 
synthesizing the literature on questions posed by agencies or Congress. 
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These committees’ studies have been recognized by both Democratic and 
Republican administrations as “the gold standard”128 and “quite 
rigorous.”129  
National Academies study committees are governed by a relaxed 
version of FACA that requires the Academies to “make best efforts to 
ensure that . . . the committee membership is fairly balanced as determined 
by the Academy to be appropriate for the functions to be performed.”130 
According to National Academies policy, a study committee needs not 
only interdisciplinary diversity but intradisciplinary diversity. “Even 
within a particular discipline,” says the National Academies policy, “there 
may be very important differences and distinctions within the field, or 
regarding the particular subject matter to be addressed, that require 
careful consideration in the committee composition and appointment 
process.”131 
There are ways to use public input to foster diversity in the selection 
of committee members, such as soliciting public nominations, as FDA132 
and EPA have done.133 Another is for agencies to publish a list of 
committee candidates—either a proposed “final cut” of members, a “short 
list” of candidates before the final cut, or a more general list of all qualified 
candidates—and to solicit public comments on selections. EPA draws on 
these methods for SAB offshoot committees’ outside members,134 and the 
National Academies are required to by statute.135 One last procedure is for 
an advisory committee to express its views publicly in draft before 
subjecting them to review by some other body of outside experts, as 
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COMM. 3 (June 7, 2016), https://www.nature.com/articles/palcomms201630 
[https://perma.cc/B5ZH-UJRH] (quoting the Obama administration’s EPA Director). 
129. Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2,664, 2,675-76 
(Jan. 14, 2005). 
130. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1) (2018).  
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4885770000079783.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SKN-V6US] (emphasis omitted). 
132. 82 Fed. Reg. 9,383, 9,383-84 n.1 (Feb. 6, 2017). 
133. EPA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 126, at 8, 15; see also, e.g., Request for 
Nominations of Candidates for EPA’s Science Advisory Board Economic Guidelines Review 
Panel, 84 Fed. Reg. 27,327 (June 12, 2019).  
134. EPA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 126, at 8, 12, 15.  
135.  5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1); Peter D. Blair, Scientific Advice for Policy in the United 
States: Lessons from the National Academies and the Former Congressional Office of Technology 
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ASSURANCE 297, 302 (Justus Lentsch & Peter Weingart eds., 2011); Our Study Process, NAT’L 
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committees advising EPA136 and committees of the National Academies137 
do. 
FACA’s stringent requirements for committee meetings to be public 
may prevent candid deliberation. But the Fed might follow the National 
Academies’ practice of holding public meetings “to gather data” but 
closing all other meetings,138 allowing a “safe space for deliberations.”139  
FDA provides a model of workable and salutary committee diversity. 
Econometric studies suggest that FDA achieves diversity within its 
committees,140 as well as between those committees and agency staff.141 
Research also shows more favorable committee votes in favor of a drug 
strongly increase the likelihood of a fast, favorable agency decision on that 
drug.142 Controlling for other factors, a drug that FDA sends through the 
advisory-committee process is also less likely to be found to have problems 
after approval.143  
b. The Agency Receives Diverse Input but Is Close-Minded 
Toward It  
Even if officials formally receive diverse input, they may not have an 
open mind toward it. This can occur during the notice-and-comment 
process. In that process, the agency develops a proposed version of the rule 
(the “preproposal phase”), then publishes the proposed rule, takes official 
public comments, processes comments, and finally publishes a final rule 
with responses to the comments. According to one leading interview-based 
study, “change during the [official] comment phase is difficult” and “occurs 
within relatively narrow bounds.”144 Another study reaches a similar 
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137. Blair, supra note 135, at 305.  
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result.145 Other studies do find that agencies change proposed rules during 
notice and comment in the direction participants seek, but only some of 
these studies demonstrate a meaningful degree of change or influence, as 
distinct from the direction of change.146  
Thus, significant change in response to official comments is uncertain 
and possibly even the exception. Further, studies examining input during 
the preproposal phase—when agencies receive input informally through 
in-person meetings, phone calls, and written submissions—uniformly find 
that such input is influential, the reason being that it occurs at an earlier 
and more plastic stage in the agency’s thinking.147  
The very act of collectively formulating, drafting, and publishing a 
proposed rule has a tendency to make officials feel committed to that 
proposal. They have had to come to agreement with each other about it, 
and after proposal, they are associated with it before a public audience.148 
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Libgober, supra note 146, at 20-24; West, Formal Procedures, supra note 144, at 72-74. Others in 
this line include Jeffrey J. Cook, Framing the Debate: How Interest Groups Influence Draft Rules 
at the United States Environmental Protection Agency, 28 ENVTL. POL’Y & GOVERNANCE 183 
(2018); Keith Naughton, Celeste Schmid, Susan Webb Yackee & Xueyong Zhan, Understanding 
Commenter Influence During Agency Rule Development, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 258 
(2009); Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, Legislation and Comment: The Making of the Section 199A 
Regulations, 69 EMORY L.J. 209, 253-55 (2019); Sara R. Rinfret, Frames of Influence: U.S. 
Environmental Rulemaking Case Studies, 28 REV. POL’Y RES. 231 (2011); Wendy E. Wagner, 
Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1366-69, 1380-
83 (2010); and Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal Agenda 
Building and Blocking during Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 373 
(2011).  
148. Stephanie M. Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and 
Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 621-30 (2002); West, Formal Procedures, 
supra note 144, at 73.  
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Besides these psychological effects, the prospect of judicial review (when 
present) tends to commit officials further. Courts do not permit agencies 
to depart too far from the proposed rule when writing the final one, since 
too great a departure detracts from the objectives of notice.149  
When soliciting comments, officials’ best strategy, epistemically, is to 
avoid committing to any one option, even informally, until after outside 
input enriches their thinking. To do this, the agency could publish an open-
ended solicitation that simply asks questions without proposing a 
solution.150 Another possibility is to publish a “menu” of two or more 
policy options and ask outsiders for comparative evaluations, or for other 
options altogether.151 The Fed itself followed this menu format for its 2010 
rulemaking on debit-card interchange fees.152 
Another way for officials to keep open minds is to promise—in a 
manner that would be professionally embarrassing to break—to respond 
to outside input in explaining their final decision. Even absent judicial 
review, professional commitments to provide a reasonable response can 
push officials to consider diverse input on the merits. Knowing that you 
must explain yourself—to the public and professional communities—
causes you to engage in preemptive self-criticism, search harder for new 
information, and reduce cognitive rigidities.153  
c. The Agency Receives Outside Input from an Environment 
Where Information Is Concentrated in One Interest 
The epistemic value of outside information depends largely on its 
diversity. But as industry complexity increases, the agency becomes more 
dependent on industry for information necessary to instrumental 
reasoning, which gives industry more leverage over agency decision-
making.154 When relevant information is more concentrated within 
industry, and industry is more unified (or less diverse) in its perspectives 
and objectives, industry can start to monopolize policy development. In 
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other words, it can force the agency to choose between (i) taking industry-
preferred actions grounded in industry information or (ii) adopting 
alternative policies with little informational grounding, whose real-world 
outcomes are uncertain.155  
Consistent with this idea, studies of agency rulemakings provide 
several examples in which the lion’s share of participation comes from 
industry,156 including examples where agency adherence to industry wishes 
appears to follow from such participatory dominance.157 And several 
studies find that agencies tend to shift policy in the preferred direction of 
participants when those participants are more uniform in their views.158 
When agencies face a nondiverse, industry-dominated information 
environment, they must weigh these costs of public participation.  
Concentration of information in industry produces an additional 
perverse effect, at least at agencies facing judicial review. Because agencies 
are required by courts to answer all “significant” comments, and because 
generalist judges cannot tell which comments are truly significant from an 
expert perspective, industry might submit large amounts of superficially 
relevant comments—far beyond what genuinely helps agency policy 
judgments. The agency is legally obligated to answer these comments 
under penalty of judicial defeat. This eats up officials’ time and 
resources.159 In this way, an industry seeking to preserve the status quo can 
slow agency policy change and reduce the amount of change that a 
resource-constrained agency can achieve.160 However, when not facing 
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judicial review, the agency can escape this dynamic and impose 
intellectually justified limits on how much information it will respond to.161  
d. The Agency Receives Mass Nonsubstantive Input  
In most public-comment processes, the bulk of information that is 
useful for factual, predictive, or legal judgments comes from industry 
representatives, other agencies, state and local governments, academics, or 
NGOs. Much of the rest comes from individuals. Those individuals sending 
comments fall into two categories: (a) people who are truly unconnected 
to organized interests and sending comments on their own and (b) people 
solicited to send form letters by advocacy groups.162 Big form-letter 
campaigns affect only a tiny minority of all rulemakings,163 but in those rare 
instances, they can cause the number of comments to rise into the 
millions.164 
According to leading studies, the epistemic value of individual lay 
comments is mostly quite low. Mass form letters drummed up by advocacy 
organizations typically do little more than express value preferences, 
without providing new factual information.165  Comments from 
unconnected individuals often are likewise relatively unsophisticated and 
focused on value preferences.166 Such comments do not advance the 
deliberative and instrumentally rational approach agencies are supposed 
to adopt for executing their statutory missions. (An exception is that 
comments from unconnected individuals, in certain industry contexts, 
contain policy-relevant information that is hard to discover elsewhere, 
such as the experiences of disabled airline travelers.167)  
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Of course, agency policymaking involves not only factual and 
predictive judgments but also value choices, and therefore one can argue 
that laypersons’ value-preference comments should be considered for that 
reason.168 But there is an important counter: public comment is not meant 
to be an election, nor a representative survey of any underlying 
population.169  
In keeping with this normative argument, agencies largely ignore 
individual comments.170 With commenters unlikely to sue, and judges 
unlikely to deem their comments “significant,” judicial review provides no 
incentive to engage. Thus, as pitfalls of participation go, the phenomenon 
of mass individual commenting is no big problem. However, it does create 
one downside risk for the agency. Because agencies taking public comment 
must formally receive such comments—and because the rare proceeding 
that draws millions of comments may garner media attention for this 
reason—the public may get the false impression that the agency 
proceeding is supposed to be plebiscitary.171 In this case, the agency will 
have a political problem if it ends up defying a vast majority of millions of 
commenters. Therefore, in deciding between public comment and less 
open means of taking input, the agency must weigh the advantages of 
public comment against this downside political risk.  
II. Monetary Policy, Inflation Targeting, and Transparency 
In 2012, the FOMC issued a first Statement on Longer-Run Goals and 
Monetary Policy Strategy (Statement). This “momentous”172 document 
formalized the Fed’s assessment that “inflation at the rate of 2 percent . . . 
is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s statutory 
mandate.”173 In discussions with the FOMC, Janet Yellen, then Vice-Chair 
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of the Fed, twice analogized the Statement to a “constitution” for the Fed’s 
monetary policy.174   
In this Part, we contrast this law-like presentation of the Statement 
with its insular and secretive development process. While a law-like 
statement should enhance the Fed’s ability to credibly signal and maintain 
a commitment to low and stable inflation, the Fed’s closed process for 
developing its Statement undermined these objectives. In particular, the 
Fed’s process (a) failed to consider how the two-percent inflation goal 
could be enforced and later reevaluated; (b) left the Fed vulnerable to 
inflation-targeting groupthink, which has afflicted central bankers around 
the world; and (c) provided no formal process for revising the inflation 
target in light of future macroeconomic developments. 
We then examine how greater openness, solicitation of outside input, 
and formalized process in the development of fundamental long-term 
targets can enhance the Fed’s ability to achieve its statutory goals in the 
future. 
A. Monetary Policy and the Fed: The Importance of Signaling 
The Federal Reserve—both the Board of Governors and the 
FOMC—controls the nation’s monetary policy, one of the most significant 
areas of federal policy and the principal basis for the claim that the Fed is 
the most important of governmental agencies.175 Today, the Fed’s 
regulation of the money supply is not bound by monetary-policy rules that 
would anchor the dollar to the value of gold or other commodities, as had 
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been the case until 1973.176 Instead, by fiat, the Fed can increase or 
decrease the amount of cash and bank reserves in the economy by buying 
or selling assets for newly created money. It can also adjust the rate of 
interest it pays to banks for bank cash reserves held at the Fed, which 
causes banks to inject more or less money into the financial system.  
Congress gave the Fed broad authority over monetary policy in 
Section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act, sometimes called the Fed’s 
“mandate.” “Mandate” is an appropriate label for this legislative directive:  
 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal 
Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary 
and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential 
to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum 
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.177  
 
Although Congress identified these goals clearly and emphatically—
the Fed “shall” conduct monetary policy consistent with these objectives—
Congress granted the Fed considerable discretion in implementing 
monetary policy consistent with these goals. The Fed thus enjoys what 
economists call “instrument independence”—it can choose what tools to 
use to pursue its goals—but not “goal independence,” for Congress has 
clearly articulated what the goals of monetary policy must be.178  
The exercise of monetary policy is anchored on this dual mandate. 
When the Fed perceives that the economy is sluggish and employment 
below its maximum, it expands credit by increasing the monetary base, 
buys bonds from banks with newly created cash, and lowers the interest 
rate it pays to banks for the reserves kept at the Fed. These maneuvers 
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decrease interest rates throughout the economy.179 Lower interest rates 
lead to cheaper access to credit that encourages individuals, households, 
and businesses to spend more, which lowers unemployment.  
Conversely, the Fed can decide that a growing economy is in fact an 
inflationary economy, meaning that wages and prices are rising 
independently of the productive optimization of economic resources. In 
that event, the Fed becomes more sensitive to the price-stability prong of 
its mandate. To combat these risks, the Fed takes money out of the 
financial system by selling bonds and raising the rate of interest it pays on 
bank reserves. The money that bond buyers pay to the Fed leaves the 
financial system, while higher interest rates on reserves keep banks from 
deploying reserves for lending. With money scarcer, interest rates in the 
economy rise. This can combat inflation, but also runs the risk of tipping 
the economy into recession, causing job losses and hardship, especially for 
those living at the economic margin. 
This discussion reveals that effective monetary policy is not simply an 
exercise in balance-sheet management. If the Fed’s interventions do not 
cause banks to change the quantity and price of credit that they make 
available, then monetary policy will not have its desired effect on the 
economy. Similarly, inflation rates depend on more than monetary policy. 
When people and firms expect inflation, they demand higher prices, 
turning their inflation expectations into reality.180  
Signaling future intentions is key to monetary-policy success. As 
former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke pithily put it, “monetary policy is 98 
percent talk and only two percent action.”181 Indeed, the importance of 
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180. If everyone expects higher inflation, workers will demand higher nominal wages to 
maintain the purchasing power of their earnings. Firms, expecting higher prices for their products, 
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MACROECONOMICS 259-267 (4th ed. 2012) for a discussion of the role of inflation expectations in 
the determination of inflation and output. 
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credibly signaling intentions is perhaps the most important and debated 
aspect of monetary theory in the last four decades.182  
Because signaling plays such a critical role in monetary policy, the Fed 
has an incentive to make promises that individuals, households, and firms 
will not accept at face value. The Fed wants to anchor low inflation 
expectations, which push inflation downwards, whatever happens to 
output and unemployment.183 But once that expectation is locked in, the 
Fed will be tempted—sometimes by political pressures, explicit or 
implicit184—to take advantage of those expectations to ease policy and 
lower unemployment, at the expense of inflation. This incentive renders 
the Fed’s promises of low inflation noncredible, leading households and 
firms to discount Fed promises.185  
Lack of credibility in promising low inflation can be a fatal flaw for a 
central bank. If households and firms expect high inflation, then inflation 
will be higher than otherwise even if the Fed never prints money to 
temporarily lower unemployment.186 When a central bank loses its 
inflation-fighting credibility entirely, a monetary-policy or even political 
regime change becomes necessary.187 
To avoid these outcomes, the Fed enjoys significant “independence,” 
or insulation from political pressures. Independence enables the Fed to 
focus on fixing inflation expectations free from political interference and, 
by implication, preserving freedom of movement for fighting 
unemployment. Some of these institutional features that promote 
independence are written into the Federal Reserve Act, including longer 
terms of service for members of the Board of Governors188 and removal 
from the congressional appropriations process.189 Other features are more 
informal, including politicians’ (usual) restraint from commenting on 
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monetary policy. Regardless, the Fed, like most central banks, enjoys 
remarkable independence for an administrative agency.190  
Its independence notwithstanding, the Fed’s mandate to fight both 
inflation and unemployment creates for it the basic problem of credible 
signaling—even without political pressures to abandon inflation 
commitments. The Fed itself may want to permit slightly higher inflation 
to bring down unemployment—raising inflation expectations. Research on 
monetary policy offers many solutions to this problem. One solution is to 
appoint central bankers who dislike inflation more than the typical person, 
perhaps because they come from a class with anti-inflation leanings.191 
When the public knows such a person is appointed, the central banker’s 
professional reputation is staked on achieving low inflation.192 Lower 
inflation follows. 
Another proposed solution to the credible-commitment problem calls 
for mechanistic legal rules to limit central-bank discretion, preventing 
central bankers from succumbing to temptations to tolerate higher 
inflation.193 These solutions depend on the availability of judicial 
enforcement—the simplest source of credible commitment by any 
agency.194 In the Fed’s case, the standing doctrine undermines this 
approach,195 although this has not been discussed in the economics 
literature. If no one can sue the Fed over monetary policy, then even a 
strict monetary-policy rule enacted by Congress (such as the fixed annual 
monetary-growth rule favored by Milton Friedman196) could not be 
enforced.  
A third possible solution to the credibility problem presented itself 
during the 1980s and 1990s. In this era, inflation expectations fell 
dramatically throughout the industrialized world. Theorists supporting the 
two solutions above have claimed vindication from this “Great 
Moderation”—Fed Chair Paul Volcker really was more anti-inflationary 
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than the average person, and his FOMC did, for a time, follow basic rules 
of monetary restraint.197 But theory did not predict the change in 
institutional design that had the most important impact: the rise of inflation 
targeting across the world.198 In 1989, the New Zealand Parliament passed 
a law instructing its central bank to target a two-percent inflation rate. This 
single, specific charge substantially simplified the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand’s mandate by removing consideration of unemployment 
entirely.199 Over time, inflation targeting spread throughout the globe. 
Today, central banks covering countries as diverse as Australia, 
Guatemala, and Romania all practice inflation targeting.200 
Inflation targeting solved the central-bank credibility problem 
directly. A central banker evaluated exclusively on an inflation target has 
no incentive to tolerate higher inflation to increase employment, whatever 
their personal preferences. Their professional reputation depends upon 
hitting the target. As a result, inflation targeting credibly signals low 
inflation, reducing inflation expectations. Moreover, it does so without 
commanding the central bank to follow a rigid rule, which may specify 
inappropriate actions in unforeseen circumstances. By focusing on 
outcomes rather than methods, inflation targeting offers an objective and 
transparent target, which enhances credibility while retaining flexibility as 
to the instruments to be used in achieving this goal.  
B. The Federal Reserve’s Adoption of a Two-Percent Inflation Goal in 
2012  
Before the 2008 financial crisis, the Fed had built up a reputation as 
an effective inflation-fighting central bank. This reputation came largely 
from its successes at taming high inflation in the 1970s (at significant cost) 
and subsequently from preserving low inflation through periods of both 
increased economic productivity and some mild recessions. This success 
and the value of this reputation meant that the Fed continued to privilege 
inflation fighting up through the 2008 crisis, even as evidence mounted that 
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the crisis was leading to a major recession—a focus that former Fed Chair 
Ben Bernanke now regards as one of his biggest errors in office.201 
The Fed had built this reputation, however, without ever explicitly 
endorsing a numerical inflation target. This changed in 2012. In that year, 
the FOMC issued a press release that specified its “longer-run goals and 
policy strategy” and announced a “goal” for inflation of two percent.202 
The announcement—the first time the FOMC publicly stated a 
quantitative interpretation of its statutory mandate—“mark[ed] a truly 
momentous occasion in the history of the FOMC . . . and a notable step in 
the history of central banking.”203 The Statement, with very slight 
amendments, was reaffirmed repeatedly by the FOMC from 2012-2019.204  
The FOMC Statement began by affirming that “[t]he FOMC is firmly 
committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from the Congress of 
promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term 
interest rates.”205 The press release then refined the FOMC’s 
interpretation of the dual mandate. It announced a long-run goal for 
inflation but not unemployment, despite significant debates about a 
numerical target for unemployment as well.206 A subsequent press release 
                                                                                                             
201. For a summary of the critique that the Fed has kept monetary policy too tight for 
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briefly explained how this asymmetry might be “most consistent with [the 
Fed’s] dual mandate.”207 No numerical target is “appropriate” for 
unemployment because the “maximum level of employment is largely 
determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamic 
of the labor market” and thus does not lend itself to a “fixed goal.”208 
Estimates of “maximum employment” do fluctuate more often than 
estimates of the optimal inflation rate.209 Nevertheless, the Fed could have 
announced its estimate of maximum employment alongside its inflation 
target and updated the employment target annually. By announcing a 
numerical goal for inflation but not employment in the FOMC Statement, 
the Fed fostered differential accountability. While an inflation rate well 
above or below the Fed’s target provides clear evidence of policy failure, 
failure to achieve maximum employment is much less salient.  
The FOMC’s Statement provided little guidance for how the Fed 
would address conflicts between its two-percent inflation goal and its less-
defined mandate to maximize employment. Instead, the Statement 
asserted that these objectives “are generally complementary.”210 As we will 
see below, however, this assertion is problematic. During periods of very 
low interest rates—conditions that prevailed during 2012—many observers 
believe there is a long-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. 
The FOMC Statement of 2019 hardly discussed this possibility, stating 
merely that “under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the 
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objectives are not complementary, it follows a balanced approach in 
promoting them.”211 
Although the FOMC’s Statement reaffirmed the Fed’s commitment 
to its dual mandate, minimizing the tension between its inflation goal and 
its employment objective caused many to misinterpret the Fed’s 
announcement to mean it was now targeting inflation as its primary goal. 
Headlines read, “In Historic Shift, Fed Sets Inflation Target,”212 and asked 
“why the Fed targets [two-percent] inflation.”213 Indeed, the FOMC’s 
internal communication themselves reflected this ambiguity. One member 
of the FOMC described the announcement as a “textbook statement on 
what flexible inflation targeting is.”214  
1. Signaling and the Federal Reserve’s 2012 Announcement of an 
Inflation Goal 
The FOMC’s press release interpreting its statutory mandate to 
include a two-percent inflation target is best understood as a guidance 
document—an announcement of a plan that is not legally enforceable 
against the agency but may nonetheless powerfully shape the agency’s 
behavior and other parties’ expectations.215 It is instructive to analyze that 
document, and its drafting process, under the two theoretical frames 
highlighted in this Article: credible signaling and diversity of inputs. 
Although the Fed’s two-percent inflation target created no legal 
obligations, its mere transparency did enhance the Fed’s credibility as an 
inflation fighter. The target is both public and objective, meaning everyone 
can tell if the Fed misses. This means the Fed and its leaders are staking 
some of their reputational capital on hitting it, raising the public’s 
confidence that they will try hard to do so.   
Indeed, the FOMC’s formal announcement of the two-percent goal 
was explicitly about signaling. As Fed Chair Ben Bernanke said to the 
FOMC on the eve of the announcement, “What [the announcement] is 
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trying to do is increase our transparency and our accountability by making 
our communication clearer to the public. There is a lot of evidence that 
communication and transparency are valuable to monetary policy in the 
long term.”216  
In addition to the reputational threat of missing its inflation goal, 
formally announcing its two-percent goal made it harder for the Fed to 
change its goal opportunistically shortly thereafter. As then-Vice Chair 
Janet Yellen explained to the FOMC, the announcement of a two-percent 
goal meant the following:  
 
“[A]ll of us will have the same 2 percent inflation goal in mind when we 
have those discussions around the FOMC table, and on occasions where 
inflation deviates from that goal, the public will clearly understand our 
intention to bring inflation back to that goal over time, rather than 
wondering whether the Committee might allow inflation to drive upward 
indefinitely, as occurred in the 1970s.”217 
 
The Fed’s announcement of a two-percent goal, therefore, 
demonstrates how transparency can enhance the signaling value of central-
bank decisions.218 Based on this outcome alone, the Fed’s administrative-
law procedures might, at first glance, seem successful. Unfortunately, 
however, the law-like nature of the 2012 announcement was preceded by 
almost no process. This weakened the announcement’s credibility and 
made the Fed susceptible to factual and predictive mistakes arising from 
groupthink.  
2. Process and Credibility 
Ironically, the FOMC’s 2012 embrace of transparency surrounding its 
objectives excluded transparency about its process for developing and 
changing the two-percent inflation goal. The FOMC Statement says 
essentially nothing about these procedural considerations. The two-
percent goal itself comes from the FOMC’s “judgment,” without further 
elaboration.219 As for reconsidering the two-percent figure, the Statement 
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explains only that “[t]he Committee intends to review [the two-percent 
inflation target] and to make adjustments as appropriate at its annual 
organizational meeting each January.”220 This is a remarkably open-ended 
account of how to amend a “constitution” of monetary policy. The 
inflation target is highly transparent but derived from an opaque process.  
This secrecy about process partially undermines the credibility gained 
from announcing the target. If the two-percent goal can be changed easily, 
then workers, businesses, and investors have less reason to trust the 
FOMC’s commitment than if the FOMC adopted a formal reconsideration 
process. In fact, in confidential internal deliberations, FOMC members 
contemplated a “high bar for such adjustments [to the formal two-percent 
inflation goal] roughly similar to making an amendment to a 
constitution.”221 Yet the FOMC did not explain what this “high bar” was, 
or how it would think through adjustments. It was silent on the policy 
tradeoffs, value judgments, and other discussions that would point toward 
that reevaluation.  
The tension between the Fed’s dual mandate and an inflation target’s 
prioritization of price stability over maximizing employment also 
undermines the announcement’s credibility gains. Downplaying the 
possibility of conflict between the inflation target and employment 
maximization made the Fed’s commitment less transparent. And 
expansive agency interpretations like the Fed’s (which privileged one part 
of the dual mandate relative to the other), even if defensible, inevitably 
enjoy less long-term credibility than others, regardless of the prospect for 
judicial review.  
C. Intellectual Homogeneity and Groupthink at the Fed  
A major reason for the procedural errors surrounding the inflation 
target is the Fed’s susceptibility to groupthink. To appreciate why, it is 
important to see that monetary policy has a peculiar political environment, 
surprisingly free from lobbying by concentrated economic interest groups. 
An owner of capital may have conflicting interests about inflation—it 
makes the economy run hotter but reduces the value of debt.222 Organized 
labor’s consistent opposition to tight monetary policy has become less 
important as labor’s influence has faced a secular decline.223 Banks and 
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mutual funds might have some stake in lowering inflation, but they care 
much more about the direct regulation of their businesses. And the worst 
aspect of inflation—the risk of hyperinflation—is like accidental nuclear 
war: it would be disastrous for everyone, but nobody has a concentrated 
interest in preventing it.  
As a result, Fed leaders, when conducting monetary policy, have 
historically interacted mainly with a narrow, technocratic community. This 
group includes agency staff, conventional macroeconomists, and officials 
of foreign central banks and international organizations, like the 
International Monetary Fund and Bank for International Settlements, in 
Basel, Switzerland. Though elite and multinational, this community is 
small and club-like, putting the Fed at risk of groupthink.  
This insularity begins with education and personal relationships. 
Many prominent central bankers obtained Ph.Ds. in macroeconomics at 
elite universities. Indeed, many of them, including Ben Bernanke (former 
Chair at the Fed) and Mario Draghi (former head of the ECB), among 
others, shared the same dissertation adviser at MIT—Stanley Fischer, who 
is himself a prominent central banker as both the Governor of the Bank of 
Israel and later Vice Chair of the Fed’s Board of Governors.224 Central 
bankers and their research staffers meet multiple times a year to discuss 
the latest developments and trends in macroeconomics. In addition to 
talking shop, central bankers often form close professional friendships as 
a result of their frequent meetings.225  
Epistemically, mainstream macroeconomics provides the frame for 
monetary policy at central banks worldwide, including the Fed. (A vast 
academic literature examines inflation targeting, for example.226) 
Conventional macroeconomics uses a standard set of tools, dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, which attempt to derive 
macroeconomic phenomena from equations specifying the behavior of 
individual consumers and firms.227 Even though there are other 
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“heterodox” schools of academic macroeconomics and monetary policy, 
such as the post-Keynesian and Austrian traditions,228 these schools do not 
use the modeling conventions of mainstream macroeconomics. They are 
therefore excluded from the bastions of the mainstream such as the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the Fed. 
 Conventional mainstream macroeconomics has proven unreliable in 
its factual and predictive judgments. For one thing, conventional 
macroeconomics has taken little account of the risk of financial crisis and 
counseled against using monetary policy to address asset bubbles.229 
Accordingly, as sociologist Neil Fligstein and coauthors show through an 
analysis of FOMC transcripts, the Committee’s preoccupation with 
macroeconomics (to the near exclusion of thinking about finance and 
banking) prevented it from seeing the impending financial collapse and its 
consequences for the economy as late as mid-September 2008. A few 
FOMC members who happened to specialize in finance and banking 
expressed a far better sense of the looming risk, but those members were 
peripheral to the Committee’s discussions.230  
More generally, conventional macroeconomics, and the institutions 
that embrace it, rely upon a narrow and stylized set of models, which some 
of the worldwide central-banking community’s top insiders (though not 
Fed officials) now see as dangerous. The IMF’s Independent Evaluation 
Office in 2011 attributed the IMF’s failure during the crisis partly to 
“groupthink,” including a collective failure to link macroeconomics with 
financial-sector analysis.231 The OECD since 2012 has started a New 
Approaches to Economic Problems initiative built around “pluralism” and 
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aiming, in the words of its Secretary General, “to revisit models and 
theories to question conventional wisdoms and ‘established truths.’”232  
Andrew Haldane, the chief economist of the Bank of England, has 
said the DSGE models that dominate macroeconomics amount to an 
intellectual “mono-culture.”233 Haldane says “these models said nothing 
about the probability of a serious crisis arising endogenously at any time, 
or about the downstream consequences for the economy of a crisis once it 
had struck.” 234 “A single model framework,” warns Haldane, “is unlikely 
to best serve the needs of macroeconomists in every state of nature”; “it is 
likely that a patchwork of models will be more resilient than a single 
methodology.”235 He further notes that in “forecasting, there is evidence 
that combining two or more models leads to greater predictive power than 
using one model alone.”236 He explains that a “‘zoo of models’ approach 
has . . . been adopted at the Bank of England” and advocates for modeling 
inspired partly by physics and ecology.237 Paul Romer, who won the Nobel 
Prize in 2018 for his work in macroeconomics, wrote in 2016 that 
macroeconomics had suffered a “regression into pseudoscience.”238 He 
compared macroeconomics to string theory in particle physics, with its 
“unusually monolithic community,” its “strong sense of the boundary 
between the group and other experts,” and its “disregard for and 
disinterest in ideas, opinions, and work of experts who are not part of the 
group.”239  
Intellectual monocultures intolerant of gadflies raise the risk of 
hubris. And academic macroeconomics before the Great Recession 
displayed remarkable hubris. In his presidential address to the American 
Economic Association in 2003—four years before the Great Recession—
Robert Lucas asserted that the “central problem of depression prevention 
has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for 
many decades.”240 Such absolute confidence is more likely to arise in a field 
with a single, hegemonic paradigm than ones applying heterodox methods. 
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In total, many pieces of evidence suggest that reliance on mainstream 
macroeconomics leaves the Fed exposed to the risks of groupthink.  
As for inflation targeting specifically, its rapid diffusion across 
countries, along with the target of two percent, provides further evidence 
of intellectual homogeneity and a dearth of institutionalized skepticism. 
For idiosyncratic reasons, the two-percent inflation target has become 
“global economic gospel.”241 After New Zealand adopted the first inflation 
target in 1990, choosing a “figure [that] was plucked out of the air”—two 
percent—it succeeded in taming inflation.242 The central banks following 
New Zealand simply copied New Zealand’s somewhat arbitrary target of 
two percent. Today, about 40 countries explicitly target inflation (though 
not all target two percent) as their primary central-bank objective and are 
often encouraged to do so by outside experts such as the IMF.243 
What explains this rapid spread? It cannot simply be inflation 
targeting’s success at taming inflation. Many central banks succeeded in 
controlling inflation during the 1990s and 2000s, regardless of their 
adoption of an inflation target. Instead, inflation targeting’s success was 
intellectual. Inflation targeting offered a clear anchor for inflation 
expectations, solving the credibility problem of central bankers without 
unduly constraining central-bank operations. Since fashionable ideas 
diffuse quickly through the tight network of central banking, the two-
percent inflation target’s rapid spread is perhaps unsurprising. As one 
Nobel Prize winner in economics described, “[A]s it was widely adopted, 
the 2 percent [inflation] target also, of course, acquired the great advantage 
of conventionality: central bankers couldn’t easily be accused of acting 
irresponsibly when they had the same inflation target as everyone else.”244 
Two-percent inflation targeting’s grip was so tight that even central 
banks with legislatively mandated goals in tension with inflation targeting 
tried to “fit in,” at least in part. Consider the FOMC’s Statement described 
above. The Fed’s gestures toward a two-percent inflation target 
demonstrate the power of two-percent norm within the central-banking 
community. The Fed came as close to adopting a two-percent inflation 
target as its dual mandate allowed, a path likely facilitated by its desire to 
follow central-banking orthodoxy. Alternative views—and they abound—
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could have made the decision to pursue an inflation target at all, never 
mind setting it at two percent, a much sounder one. 
D. The Flawed Economics of a Two-Percent Inflation Target When 
Interest Rates Are Constrained by the Zero Lower Bound 
The timing of the FOMC’s public adoption of a two-percent inflation 
goal is peculiar on the intellectual merits and suggestive of groupthink. The 
superiority of inflation targeting as a goal for central banks relies on the 
assumption that there is no long-run tradeoff between inflation and 
employment. If this proposition, sometimes called the “divine 
coincidence,”245 is true, then inflation targeting, it is argued, “delivers the 
best unemployment rate policy can deliver.”246  
Unfortunately, the divine coincidence was never a well-established 
empirical reality but rather a “special feature” of “standard” DSGE 
macroeconomic models (hence the tongue-in-cheek term “divine 
coincidence”).247 In a field as monolithic as macroeconomics, however, 
DSGE modeling conventions assumed a powerful role. The divine 
coincidence’s prevalence was problematic because it took for granted 
contingent macroeconomic conditions that happened to hold true before 
the Great Recession. Before 2008, with interest rates well above zero, 
central banks enjoyed considerable scope for adjusting interest rates to 
fine-tune the economy regardless of the inflation target. Targeting 
inflation therefore seemed to produce both good employment outcomes 
and low, stable inflation. 
The divine-coincidence framework, however, ignores the “zero lower 
bound” on nominal interest rates.248 Nominal interest rates measure the 
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return of an asset in currency terms, unadjusted for the inflation of prices 
of over time, while real rates of interest measure the return of an asset in 
purchasing-power terms. Nominal interest rates in general cannot go 
below zero percent because there are some assets (for example, cash, gift 
cards, and tax prepayments) that always offer a positive nominal return. 
The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates means that central bankers 
cannot lower interest rates indefinitely. If the nominal interest rate hits 
zero but the economy is still stuck in recession, then central bankers cannot 
easily stimulate the economy. Long recessions with high unemployment 
follow.  
The choice of an inflation target affects the risk of hitting the zero 
lower bound. A higher inflation target (and higher expected inflation) 
raises the typical nominal interest rate, as savers demand a higher nominal 
interest return to compensate for higher expected inflation. As a result, a 
higher inflation target reduces the risk of nominal interest rates being 
constrained by the zero lower bound. And having fewer recessions with 
monetary-policy stimulus constrained by the zero lower bound results in 
higher overall employment. If a higher inflation target means higher 
average employment when nominal rates are near zero, then the divine 
coincidence fails; there is a tradeoff between expected inflation and 
employment.249  
In January 2012, when the Fed formally adopted its two-percent 
inflation goal, the U.S. short-term nominal interest rate equaled zero. The 
policy case for the two-percent target, therefore, was weaker when the Fed 
adopted the two-percent goal than when other central banks did in the 
1990s. Events since 2008 put the divine-coincidence model underpinning 
inflation targeting on much weaker ground in 2012 than before the Great 
Recession. This is not merely hindsight speaking. In 2010—well before the 
Fed announced its two-percent inflation goal—the chief economist of the 
IMF broke from central banking orthodoxy to ask “[h]ow [l]ow [s]hould 
the [i]nflation [t]arget [b]e?” in response to the Great Recession’s evidence 
that the zero lower bound constrained macroeconomic policy.250 Many 
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other once-fringe ideas about central-bank targets, such as nominal GDP 
targeting, also rose in prominence during this period for the same reason.251 
The FOMC’s announcement, however, betrays no hint of this intellectual 
ferment.252 
E. The Possibly Flawed Economics of Inflation Targeting Outside of the 
Zero Lower Bound 
Beginning in December 2015, U.S short-term interest rates targeted 
by the Federal Reserve started to exceed zero percent for the first time 
since 2008. Even in these circumstances, however, the Fed’s two-percent 
inflation targeting did not fare well. First, inflation consistently fell slightly 
below two percent during this period, even though the economy grew 
robustly.253 More importantly, the Fed’s predictions for maximum 
employment during this period were inaccurate. The Fed consistently 
predicted that inflation would rise when unemployment fell below a 
certain rate. But the unemployment rate kept falling below these estimates 
without causing inflation, suggesting flaws in the models underlying the 
Fed’s inflation goal. These flaws were highlighted by a remarkable 
admission by Fed Chair Jerome Powell in response to questions from 
Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. 
 
Ocasio-Cortez: In early 2014, the Federal Reserve believed that the long 
run unemployment rate was around 5.4 percent. In early 2018, it [w]as 
estimated that this was now lower, around 4.5 percent. Now, the estimate is 
around 4.2 percent. What is the current unemployment rate today? 
 
Powell: 3.7 percent. 
 
Ocasio-Cortez: 3.7 percent . . . Unemployment has fallen about three full 
points since 2014 but inflation is no higher today than it was five years ago. 
Given these facts, do you think it’s possible that the Fed’s estimates of the 
lowest sustainable unemployment rate may have been too high? 
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Powell: Absolutely.254  
 
If the Fed kept monetary policy inappropriately tight from 2016-2019 
in a flawed effort to keep inflation at the two-percent goal, as this dialogue 
suggests, then this target needs rethinking. Moreover, the failure of the 
Fed’s models, which justify its inflation target, points to legal tension 
between the Fed’s statutory dual mandate and its inflation goal. Recall that 
Congress commanded the Fed to pursue maximum employment as well as 
stable prices.255 The FOMC Statement justified an inflation target by 
asserting that the two “objectives are generally complementary.”256 But 
recent history disputes that assertion. The Fed has performed acceptably 
from an inflation-targeting standpoint—only narrowly undershooting the 
two-percent target. It has performed poorly, however, from a maximum-
employment perspective. It has overestimated the “maximum 
unemployment rate consistent with stable inflation” by an average of more 
than a percentage point—over twenty-five percent of that rate’s value—
over the last five years. Targeting two-percent inflation thus did not 
complement maximum employment.257 Indeed, it likely led the Fed to 
tolerate unnecessarily low employment. As a result, the FOMC’s goal may 
no longer be consistent with the dual mandate. 
F. Rethinking the Two-Percent Inflation Goal: Opening up the Process  
To its credit, the Fed has recognized the need to adjust its approach. 
In 2019, it announced it was “[e]mbark[ing] on a [r]ethink of [i]ts [i]nflation 
[t]arget” to help it “confront[] the constraints that come with interest rates 
that are still historically low.”258 As Chair Powell said, “my colleagues and 
I on the FOMC are undertaking a year-long review of the Federal 
Reserve’s monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication 
practices.”259 But the Fed’s real commitment to open-mindedness was 
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unclear. Powell added, “[c]onsistent with the experience of other central 
banks with these reviews, the process is more likely to produce evolution 
rather than revolution. We seek no changes in law and we are not 
considering fundamental changes in the structure of the Fed, or in the 2 
percent inflation objective.”260 The leader’s articulation of an expected 
outcome before the decision-making process begins is a classic cause of 
groupthink. 
The Fed’s rethink culminated in the announcement of an average 
inflation target of two percent in a revised Statement in August 2020. The 
revised Statement explained that the FOMC now “seeks to achieve 
inflation that averages [two] percent over time, and therefore judges that, 
following periods when inflation has been running persistently below [two] 
percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation 
moderately above [two] percent for some time.”261 The revised Statement 
did not define the time horizon over which the Fed will seek to bring 
average inflation to two percent if it has deviated from this number.262 The 
Statement therefore allows for a wide range of possible policies. Before 
this revision, by contrast, the Fed let inflation “bygones be bygones” and 
did not allow past failures to hit two-percent inflation to affect its inflation 
target moving forward.  The Statement (like its 2012 predecessor) ran to 
only a single page, with no further explanation nor any express 
engagement with any interlocutors—though the Statement did anticipate 
that the Fed will “undertake roughly every [five] years a thorough public 
review of its monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication 
practices.”263 
The Fed’s process for producing the 2020 Statement indicates that the 
agency has begun to see that it needs a more open process for developing 
policies like the inflation target. As Powell explained in starting the review 
in 2019, it would “involve a series of ‘Fed Listens’ events around the 
country,” including “town-hall-style meetings and a conference where 
academic and nonacademic experts will share their views.”264 This was 
                                                                                                             




261. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 173. 
262. See The Fed’s New Framework, U.S. ECONOMICS ANALYST (Goldman Sachs, New 
York, N.Y.), Aug. 30, 2020, 
https://www.gspublishing.com/content/research/en/reports/2020/08/31/85cbfe5b-08da-4124-b48e-
9851529a64e6.html [https://perma.cc/K8P7-S2DN].  
263. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 173.  
264. Powell, supra note 259.  
 
Yale Journal on Regulation   Vol. 38:1, 2021 
58 
 
unprecedented—“the first time the Fed has opened itself up in this way.”265 
In addition, two of the New York Fed’s outside academic advisory 
committees have discussed inflation targeting in the last two years; for each 
committee, the discussion took up one part of one of its semiannual 
meetings.266 
But the Fed must go further in opening its process to outside input if 
it is to overcome groupthink’s risks. The Fed would make better decisions 
about inflation targeting if it took public comment on the matter—as 
agencies often voluntarily do on guidance documents—and, as either a 
complement or substitute, took full advantage of advisory-committee 
input. Such reforms would improve the process by which the Fed 
contemplates “undertak[ing] … a public review” of its monetary policy 
strategy every five years, exposing the Fed regularly to outside opinion.267 
The Fed’s 2019 “town-hall-style meetings,” cited by Powell, were 
really a series of twelve conferences, usually a day or half-day each, 
organized by each of the Reserve Banks and attended by that bank’s 
president and one Fed Governor. They consisted mainly of presentations 
and discussions with community leaders, business leaders, and a few 
academics—who were apparently invited by the Reserve Bank—with 
some time for Q&A with whatever audience showed up.268 The centerpiece 
“conference” cited by Powell was a two-day event in Chicago in June 2019 
at which seven economists presented papers (with commentators), and 
economists took part in two panels with speakers including business and 
labor representatives.269 In other words, the whole initiative was a series of 
one-off meetings, where participants were either Fed invitees or others 
who showed up to ask questions during the limited Q&A.  
Public comment taking on inflation targeting—coupled with a 
reputation-staking promise by the Fed to publish comment responses—
                                                                                                             
265. U.S. ECONOMICS ANALYST, supra note 262. 
266.  Minutes of the Economic Advisory Panel Meeting November 17, 2017, FED. 
RESERVE BANK N.Y. (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/advisory_panel/eap/eapminutes_nov2
017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JK3-PPPN]; Research & Statistics Grp., Monetary Policy Advisory 
Panel: Meeting of March 30, 2018 Minutes, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/advisory_panel/mpap/mpap_20180330
_minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBQ7-Q537]. 
267. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 173.  
268. See Review of Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communications: Fed Listens, 
BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. (Aug. 27, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-
communications-fed-listens-events.htm [https://perma.cc/3JN4-N4VT] (displaying links to 
materials used for the Fed Listens initiative).  
269. Conference on Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communication Practices (A 
Fed Listens Event), BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/conferences/conference-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-
communications-20190605.htm [https://perma.cc/26GD-G8TC]. 
Towards an Administrative Law of Central Banking 
59 
 
would be way to test and strengthen the Fed’s understanding. Public 
comment is formally open and impersonal, which means the agency cannot 
choose its interlocutors, and the promise of a response forces the agency 
to engage with ideas it did not invite. The written nature of both the 
comments and the response allows for fully researched debate, as opposed 
to conferences with arbitrary time limits. The invitation-centered format 
of “Fed Listens,” in short, will not help the Fed transcend conventional 
macroeconomics paradigms—as urged by the OECD, Haldane, and 
Romer.  
To be sure, the interest-group representatives invited to the Fed 
events came from diverse sectors, and the Fed deserves credit for that, but 
it is academics who are uniquely positioned to influence technocratic 
officials, coming as they do from the same epistemic community. 
Unfortunately, the academics invited to “Fed Listens” were not 
intellectually diverse. All seven of the papers presented at the Chicago 
conference were authored by economists firmly entrenched in 
conventional academic macroeconomics, finance, or labor economics. 
Eleven out of the thirteen co-authors (including at least one co-author of 
each paper) are members of the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER), a position that signals mainstream success in academic 
economics. The conference included no papers by post-Keynesian 
macroeconomists, a heterodox school of macroeconomics very much 
outside the mainstream.270 Nor were any papers written by economists who 
come from the Austrian tradition, who favor nominal GDP targeting, or 
who follow other heterodox schools of economics (such as Modern 
Monetary Theory) that have produced provocative insights about 
monetary policy.271 Both the Post-Keynesian and Austrian schools, for 
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instance, have developed important insights on the tight linkages between 
financial markets and business cycles, a subject only recently emphasized 
by the academic mainstream.272 While the Fed would benefit from hearing 
such perspectives, for instance when considering how monetary policy 
should respond to rapid asset-price changes, these voices were absent from 
“Fed Listens.” 
The ultimate outcome of the Fed’s rethink of the inflation goal—an 
average inflation target of two percent announced with no more than a 
single page of explanation or justification—did little to assuage these 
concerns about groupthink. Average-inflation was perceived by observers 
as the “widely anticipated”273 or even “preordained”274 outcome of the 
rethink.  It is impossible to know if the Fed Listens campaign materially 
informed the Fed’s rethink or served as window dressing to an internal re-
evaluation along the lines of the original 2012 Statement.   
1. Notice and Comment on Monetary Regime Change 
The Fed should consider a robust, notice-and-comment process to 
complement measures like its “Fed Listens” campaign to ensure that it is 
open to feedback that will differ from the mainstream approaches it has 
already undertaken. A more intellectually open process would also help 
the Fed address the full range of questions implicated by inflation 
targeting, which go beyond economics. Inflation targeting implicates what 
the dual mandate means legally—and whether it permits the Fed to set a 
target for inflation but not employment. In part, this is a factual and 
predictive question, in that the answer may depend on whether a long-run 
tradeoff between inflation and employment actually exists. But this 
question also goes to the Fed’s broader charge from Congress and whether 
the agency is honoring both halves of it—and relatedly, to the stability and 
predictability of the constitutional order. It implicates constitutional law, 
statutory interpretation, and political economy, as well as 
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macroeconomics. The Chicago conference had no scholars who could 
speak professionally to these matters.  
While public comment on inflation targeting entails certain risks and 
costs, some can be avoided and the others are worth the benefits. First, to 
obtain the real value of notice and comment discussed in Part I, the Fed 
needs to avoid prejudging comments. Rather than invest in devising a 
single course of action, the Fed can spark more productive debate by laying 
out divergent options and inviting comment on their relative merits, or 
perhaps even taking comment on an open-ended basis. Agencies 
sometimes choose to avoid this open approach because judicial doctrine 
penalizes them for not giving clear notice of their proposals. But the 
remote chance that any plaintiff has standing to challenge open-market 
operations—or general guidance thereon, like an inflation target—gives 
the Fed more latitude.  
Second, there is some risk that public comment could become a forum 
for political theater by advocacy groups drumming up large volumes of 
non-substantive, “vote-like” comments. But this risk is not very high, given 
that Fed rulemaking in 2015 on an even more politically momentous 
subject—bailouts—did not produce such a circus.275  
Third, taking comment and responding will unavoidably entail some 
delay and expenditure of resources. But an inflation target is by definition 
a long-term goal, not a time-sensitive one. Because it is unlikely to face 
judicial review, the Fed can keep its response to what is intellectually 
reasonable and profitable, instead of the excessive type of response that 
courts have regrettably forced other agencies to make. And expenditures 
the Fed does incur would have offsetting benefits in both improving the 
Fed’s factual and predictive judgments, and also rendering Fed’s ultimate 
policy commitment more credible. If the Fed shows that it alters its goals 
only after costly deliberation, it signals that its goals will not shift on a whim 
or without warning.  
2. Diverse Advisory Committees 
Besides public comment, advisory committees are another useful 
device to overcome the risk of agency groupthink,276 but they are one the 
Fed has yet to fully tap. Such committees can be used in conjunction with 
notice and comment or—if the agency fears that public comment will be 
too circus-like or expensive—can serve as a valuable, if imperfect, 
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substitute. Compared to one-off conferences, advisory committees have a 
stronger public identity and relationship to the agency; this makes it hard 
for the agency to ignore the committee. Already, the Fed has a long 
tradition of using advisory committees of bankers and business leaders to 
monitor economic conditions.277 Such committees provide valuable 
information but are problematically one-sided in highlighting only the 
views of mainstream capitalists, and especially bankers.  
To its credit, the Fed has been diversifying its advisory committees. 
The Board created a Community Advisory Council in 2015, including 
many NGO and civic leaders, to advise “on the economic circumstances 
and financial services needs of consumers and communities, with a 
particular focus on the concerns of low- and moderate-income consumers 
and communities.”278 Several Reserve Banks have established similar 
bodies, most quite recently.279 Yet the Board’s Community Advisory 
Council has barely discussed monetary policy and never discussed inflation 
targeting in its eleven meetings since inception.280 Besides these panels of 
bankers, businesspersons, and community leaders, the Fed has a few 
panels that have no interest-representation component but simply analyze 
facts and make predictions. Of these committees, staffed almost entirely 
with academics, one that covers stress-test models is housed at the Board. 
The other three, which respectively cover the economy generally, 
monetary policy, and finance, are housed at the New York Fed. But while 
the members of these academic committees are illustrious, and diverse in 
party affiliation, they have done little to fundamentally test the Fed’s 
thinking about inflation targeting. In 2012, two committees discussed the 
two-percent target after the FOMC announced it, and the minutes show 
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that no member of either committee questioned the idea of an inflation-
only target or the two-percent number.281 Minutes of the committees on 
the economy and monetary policy in fall 2017 and spring 2018 respectively 
reflect continued discussion of the two-percent inflation target with no 
questioning of its fundamentals.282 (The New York Fed also terminated the 
committee on monetary policy in July 2019 with no explanation.)283  
The Fed could take better advantage of its advisory committees if it 
consulted a wider range of them on monetary policy—such as the 
Community Advisory Council—and if it added greater intellectual 
diversity to its committees. It could do so either by turning over 
membership on existing ones or creating a new committee devoted entirely 
to inflation targeting. As noted in Part I, various devices are available to 
promote this diversity, including public nominations, public comment on 
the “short list” of candidates (perhaps with a Fed response explaining the 
final selection), and establishment of a separate committee of peer 
reviewers to evaluate the main committee’s work product. (The Board 
already takes applications from the public for membership on the 
Community Advisory Council.284) Plus, diversifying the Fed’s academic 
committees offers the prospect of positive change within the field of 
economics. Agencies and their corresponding academic disciplines can 
mutually influence each other;285 by broadening participation, therefore, 
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the Fed itself could drive general intellectual expansion in the intellectual 
horizons of macroeconomics.  
Finally, public comment and advisory-committee proceedings often 
draw the attention of Congress to the agency decisions at issue.286 In the 
case of the FOMC’s selection of its long-term goals, this would be entirely 
appropriate. A central bank needs “instrument independence”: it should 
be “free to choose the settings for its instruments in order to pursue its 
ultimate objectives.”287 It should not have “goal independence” that 
enables the bank itself “to set the final objectives for monetary policy.”288 
If a more open process reduces the Fed’s “goal independence,” then this 
result may enhance the Fed’s legitimacy without substantially 
compromising its effectiveness. 
III. Crisis Response: Emergency Lending 
Central banks have not always had a very strong interest in 
transparency. But “[w]hereas central bankers once believed in secrecy and 
even mystery, greater openness is now considered a virtue.”289 This 
emphasis on transparency, however, is limited mostly to the processes and 
outcomes associated with conventional monetary policy—especially the 
Fed’s practice since 1994 of formally announcing target interest rates. For 
another key component of the Fed’s extraordinary powers—its ability to 
make emergency loans that provide liquidity throughout the financial 
system and, increasingly, the entire economy—the Fed’s experience with 
transparency is much more limited.  
In this Part, we discuss emergency lending and how the Fed 
explained—and did not explain—its legal authority for emergency lending 
in the 2008 crisis, its first major use of this power since the Great 
Depression. We argue that the failure to engage in a more transparent legal 
process around emergency-lending decisions impaired the Fed’s public 
communications about its policy intentions. This harmed the Fed’s ability 
to signal its intentions to affected parties and raised the cost of the crisis. 
In addition, the absence of legal process weakened the Fed’s legal analysis 
by cutting it off from debate and feedback. This shut out voices within the 
fragmented financial industry, from others who rely on robust lending 
markets, and from those disconnected from the financial system 
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altogether. Better legal process, therefore, would have produced better 
outcomes. 
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has changed the world in striking 
ways, including in how the Fed reengaged emergency lending to stabilize 
the financial system and the economy as the virus swept the nation. 
Although we use 2008 as the anchoring example of the Fed’s secrecy in 
emergency lending, the policy prescriptions we offer—a guidance structure 
that invites the public into the Fed’s conception of its legal authorities—
would help the Fed accomplish its lending goals amid a growing chorus of 
legal critics.290  
A. Why the Fed Lends in an Emergency 
When many financial institutions fail simultaneously, monetary policy 
alone, no matter how decisive, cannot prevent recessions and depressions. 
To prevent financial panics, Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, 
originally added during the 1930s, authorizes the Fed to engage in 
emergency lending, unlimited in amount, in “unusual and exigent 
circumstances.”291 This emergency authority is an important tool for a 
central bank to have. Banking, by its very nature, is fragile: traditional 
banks hold assets (loans) of long duration that cannot be turned into cash 
easily, while their liabilities (customer deposits) can walk out the door in a 
moment. This is true for even the best-managed of banks, and in a crisis, 
well-managed banks facing liquidity constraints can fail just as easily as 
poorly managed banks that are in fact insolvent. Even sorting them from 
each other becomes very difficult in a crisis.292  
The financial benefits notwithstanding, emergency lending 
interventions are political disasters, seen as they are as sops to industry and 
the consequence of regulatory capture.293 Indeed, perhaps no events in the 
Fed’s history have prompted more public scrutiny than its extraordinary 
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actions to save the financial system in 2008.294 Interestingly, the Fed’s most 
controversial decision involved a failure to engage in emergency lending. 
Lehman Brothers was not rescued, became the largest bankruptcy in U.S. 
history, and substantially exacerbated the 2008 financial crisis. Rather than 
initiating an era of Fed passivity, however, Lehman’s failure was followed 
quickly by Fed emergency loans first to AIG and eventually more than 
$700 billion in loans to thousands of entities,295 including money market 
mutual funds;296 major banks;297 and many other individuals, corporations, 
and partnerships.298  
These decisions have remained among the most hotly debated in the 
political discussions of the crisis and its aftermath. More than a decade 
later, scholars and policymakers still debate the meaning of Lehman 
Brothers.299 What is less well understood is the legal basis for these 
actions.300 This confusion is particularly curious given how often 
policymakers pointed to law as the limiting factor in their approach to 
wielding their emergency lending powers. 
B. The Fed’s Emergency Lending in 2008-2009 
The Fed’s emergency lending in the crisis of 2008-09 was opaque in 
rationale and, partly because of that, unpredictable in execution, meaning 
it arguably exacerbated the crisis. It began with the use of Section 13(3) for 
the emergency rescue of Bear Stearns in early 2008. The Fed gave little 
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public explanation of how it understood Section 13(3) and of why it 
deemed Bear to meet the requirements of that provision.301 As reporters 
at the Wall Street Journal put it in the week after this extraordinary 
intervention, the Fed “more or less threw its rule book out the window” in 
order to save Bear. 302 “The question now looming over the transaction,” 
the journalists wrote, was, “Has the government set a precedent for 
propping up failing financial institutions at a time when its more traditional 
tools don’t appear to be working?”303  
The very act of the rescue, absent some framing rationale to cabin the 
apparent precedent, struck observers as legally creative and aggressive. In 
a stunning departure from central banking decorum, former Fed Chair 
Paul Volcker gave a speech shortly after the Bear decision arguing that the 
Bernanke Fed went to “the very edge” of their legal authority to save 
Bear.304 “Out of perceived necessity,” Volcker argued, “sweeping powers 
have been exercised in a manner that is neither natural nor comfortable 
for a central bank.”305 The New York Times interpreted those comments 
as “chiding,” a rare rebuke from the ex-Fed Chair to the current one.306 
In the words of one Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) 
Commissioner, giving voice to a widespread criticism, “[t]he lesson taught 
by the rescue of Bear was that all large financial institutions—and 
especially those larger than Bear—would be rescued” if facing collapse.307 
This signal of Fed support invited more risk-taking on the part of firms like 
Lehman Brothers, which turned away buyers in the summer of 2008 in 
hunting for better terms.308  
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Lehman, a broker-dealer primarily regulated by the SEC, failed on 
September 15, 2008.309 The Fed did use its emergency lending authority 
under Section 13(3) to provide tens of billions of dollars to Lehman 
through the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, but it made the decision that 
it would not, or could not, provide sufficient funds to prevent Lehman’s 
bankruptcy.310 The Fed thus allowed Lehman to collapse, even though, as 
Bernanke later testified, “we were very, very confident that Lehman’s 
demise was going to be a catastrophe.”311 The Fed issued no formal 
explanation for its Lehman decision. The day after Lehman’s failure, after 
seeing just how great a catastrophe it was, the Fed changed course and lent 
$85 billion to AIG—an amount that eventually ballooned, with funds from 
the Treasury, to $182 billion.312 Over the course of the months that 
followed the emergency infusions to AIG, the Fed lent over $700 billion to 
many different borrowers.313 
Why did the Fed lend to support Bear, retreat in the face of Lehman, 
and then intervene so aggressively thereafter? Richard Fuld, the CEO of 
Lehman who rejected the private solution that the Fed pushed on him 
during the summer of 2008, responded with exasperation to congressional 
questioning. “Until the day they put me in the ground, I will wonder” why 
Lehman was allowed to fail but AIG was not.314  
C. The Indeterminate Text of Section 13(3) 
The Fed’s leaders blamed the law for its failure to rescue Lehman.315 
At the time of the crisis, the relevant language in Section 13(3) was as 
follows: 
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In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five 
members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank… to discount for any 
individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange 
when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise 
secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank. Provided, that 
before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange for an individual 
or a partnership or corporation, the Federal reserve bank shall obtain 
evidence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to 
secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.316  
 
Much of the text of 13(3) is indeterminate and undefined. Because 
Lehman was clearly “unable to secure adequate credit accommodations 
from other banking institutions,” the key question, as interpreted by the 
Fed in rejecting Lehman’s funding requests, is the phrase “secured to the 
satisfaction.”317 It bears several plausible understandings. The locution was 
unusual at the time of Sections13(3)’s enactment in the 1930s and has only 
become more so with the passage of time. In all of Westlaw’s federal and 
state court databases, the phrase “secured to the satisfaction” appears in 
212 state and federal cases. In each instance, the use of the phrase focused 
on “satisfaction,” with no clear quantity of security implied.318  
Given that the phrase is not some familiar term of art, we may look 
to the ordinary meaning of “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal 
Reserve Bank.” This phrase seems to emphasize the subjective judgment 
of the Federal Reserve Bank about the probability of repayment. It could 
suggest that some non-zero quantum of “security” has to be present, but it 
might not. If the Federal Reserve Bank is “satisfied” by no security at all, 
then perhaps the standard itself is satisfied.319 Certainly, the text indicates 
that an “indorse[ment]”320—which would entail no collateral at all—could 
satisfy the statute.  
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Ultimately the whole provision is ambiguous. Must the 
“indorse[ment]” that would meet the standard be of a certain quality? 
Must the “security” that would satisfy the Reserve Bank be defined 
objectively or subjectively? (In a crisis, the market value of any asset may 
itself be a function of the Fed’s emergency-lending decisions, meaning that 
even objective asset valuations can have multiple meanings.) The text is 
silent on these questions. It can be read to give the Fed complete discretion 
in using this crisis-averting power,321 or not. And because of the ambiguity, 
there is real risk of both failures to credibly signal policy intentions and 
failures to receive diverse inputs on the appropriate course of action for 
the Fed in an emergency.  
D. The Fed’s Shifting and Largely Unexplained Interpretations of 13(3)  
In practice, the Fed’s interpretations of Section 13(3) since 2008 
provide a very weak signal of its future behavior and reflect little to no 
engagement with constructions of the statute outside the agency. Fed 
leaders and other insiders since 2008 have given strikingly divergent 
interpretations of the meaning of “indorsed or otherwise secured to the 
satisfaction of the Fed” under Section 13(3), often without spelling out how 
they arrived at their favored interpretation.  
1. One Interpretation: 13(3) Requires Full Security 
While the Fed gave no public statutory interpretation at all in the 
moment of letting Lehman fail, Bernanke and other Fed and Treasury 
officials suggested soon after that Section 13(3) imposed a stringent 
standard that precluded Lehman’s rescue. “The difficulties at Lehman and 
AIG raised different issues,” Bernanke said in a speech to the Economic 
Club of New York in October 2008.322 “A public-sector solution for 
Lehman proved infeasible,” he stressed, “as the firm could not post 
sufficient collateral to provide reasonable assurance that a loan from the 
Federal Reserve would be repaid.”323 Two months later, Bernanke 
repeated that message:  
                                                                                                             
321. It remains true, however, that even if the Fed had such broad substantive discretion, 
the need for agreement from five out of seven Board members would still subject it to a procedural 
check. And if the Fed actions involved issuing a security, it would need the additional consent of 
one Reserve Bank. 
322. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at 
the Economic Club of New York: Stabilizing the Financial Markets and the Economy (Oct. 15, 
2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081015a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7MCT-5UEV].  
323. Id.  
 




The available collateral fell well short of the amount needed to secure a 
Federal Reserve loan sufficient to pay off the firm’s counterparties and 
continue operations. The firm’s failure was thus unavoidable, given the 
legal constraints, and the Federal Reserve and the Treasury had no choice 
but to try instead to mitigate the fallout from that event.324  
 
Law, and not policy, caused the wreckage, according to Bernanke.  
In 2011-2015, Bernanke, Paulson, and former New Yok Fed President 
Timothy Geithner retired from government and published their respective 
memoirs, each of which asserted that law prevented the Fed from saving 
Lehman.325 These were legal conclusions, however, not legal analysis. The 
closest analytical exercise the public received from one of the three key 
decision-makers was in 2018. In an interview reflecting on the crisis ten 
years later, Geithner explained the legal analysis that prevented a Fed 
bailout of Lehman: “[I]n practice [13(3)] limited the amount the Fed could 
lend to the amount of collateral available. . . . [T]here had to be a 
reasonable expectation that the collateral would fully cover the value of 
the loan.”326  
Geithner reads two constraints into the text of “indorsed or otherwise 
secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank.”327 First, “secured 
to the satisfaction” meant that the security had to be full (or reasonably 
expected to be so).328 Second, the security had to be collateral, rather than, 
for example, noncollateralized securities such as guarantees or 
endorsements.  
                                                                                                             
324. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at 
the Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce, Austin, Texas: Federal Reserve Policies in the 
Financial Crisis (Dec. 1, 2008), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081201a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7S8S-CP2A].  
325. BERNANKE, supra note 201, at 263 (“As a central bank, we had the ability to lend 
against a broad range of collateral, but we had no legal authority to overpay for bad assets or 
otherwise absorb Lehman’s losses.”); TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON 
FINANCIAL CRISES 186 (2014) (“We didn’t believe we had the legal authority to guarantee 
Lehman’s trading liabilities, even using our ‘unusual and exigent’ powers under 13(3).”); HENRY 
M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 209 (2010) (“The Fed could not legally lend to fill a hole in Lehman’s 
capital.”). 
326. Timothy F. Geithner & Andrew Metrick, Ten Years After the Financial Crisis: A 
Conversation with Timothy Geithner 4 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 1, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3246017 [https://perma.cc/9FHR-H4MN]. 
327.  12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (2018).  
328. A “full” security is a loan for which the value of assets securing the loan equals or 
exceeds the loan’s value. 
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Geithner’s analysis is echoed and expanded by Scott Alvarez, Thomas 
Baxter, and Robert Hoyt—at the time of crisis the general counsels of the 
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Treasury 
Department, respectively—in a ten-year retrospective paper presented in 
September 2018.329 The Alvarez et al. analysis acknowledges that “the 
statute sets no specific level [of security] that must be obtained, instead 
leaving the determination to the Reserve Bank.”330 It emphasizes, 
however, that 13(3) does not authorize the Fed to extend credit expecting 
to take a loss. As a result, they write, 
 
Every statute must be interpreted in harmony with its purpose, and the 
purpose of Section 13(3) (as exhibited both in its wording and in its 
legislative history) was to authorize the Fed to extend credit with the 
expectation of full repayment, not to make grants or inject capital. Funds 
extended without the expectation of full repayment may be a credit in part, 
but they are a grant or capital injection to the extent repayment is not 
reasonably expected—and are not consistent with the language or purpose 
of the section… In the case of lending to a troubled firm during a time of 
economic stress, repayment depends largely on the amount and quality of 
the security backing the credit. To be consistent with the purpose of the 
statute, the security required to satisfy the lending Reserve Bank needed to 
be at a level sufficient for the bank to reasonably believe it would be fully 
repaid.331  
 
There might be good practical and historical reasons for the Fed to 
adopt this reading of 13(3). “Fully collateralized” offers a standard that 
protects the central bank from losses, which in turn may have downstream 
protections to the public fisc. Requiring loans to be fully secured also offers 
a standard that is easier to implement consistently than other 
interpretations. Both the value of a loan and the value of its underlying 
collateral are easier to measure than more subjective valuations of 
collateral and ability to repay.332  
The interpretation of 13(3) offered by the Fed officials in these 
retrospective analyses, however, is far from the only available 
interpretation. Contrary to the suggestions of Alvarez et al., under-secured 
or even unsecured loans are not the equivalent of “grants” or capital 
injections. Lenders have a variety of ways to manage default risk: the 
                                                                                                             
329. Scott G. Alvarez, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & Robert F. Hoyt, The Legal Authorities 
Framing the Government’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis, 2 J. FIN. CRISES 3 (2020). 
330. Id. at 15.  
331. Id. 
332. In a crisis, however, determining the market value of collateral may also be difficult. 
Ball, for example, asserts that Lehman Brothers had adequate collateral, measured at market 
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provision of recourse collateral is only one of these. Lenders may also seek 
guarantees, whether by third parties or from borrowers (as the 
“indorsement” language of Section 13(3) explicitly acknowledges).333 
Lenders may lend on an under-secured basis, as is common in underwater 
mortgages.334 Or lenders may adjust the level of interest to reflect the 
default risk, as occurs commonly in, for example, the credit card 
industry.335 The variety of lending strategies is not peculiar to the private 
sector: the government also regularly lends on an under- and unsecured 
basis, as in Small Business Administration loans336 or to finance 
education.337  
2. Alternative Interpretation: 13(3) Imposes Minimal Security 
Requirements 
The stringent interpretation of 13(3) emphasized by Fed officials with 
respect to Lehman, however, was not the only interpretation applied by 
the Fed during the financial crisis. Months after Lehman Brother’s failure, 
the Board’s own General Counsel Scott Alvarez and his associates drew 
up a starkly contrasting interpretation. This was a confidential memo that 
was later disclosed only when requested by Congress’s FCIC.338 The memo 
is a remarkable document, as it explains with great creativity the 
mechanisms by which the Fed could lend money indirectly to corporations 
throughout the economy, including those on the brink of failure. It begins 
by focusing on the disjunctive, two-pronged authority the statute gives to 
the Fed, noting that the language requires that a loan be “indorsed or 
otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank.”339 This 
disjunction was intentional: it did not exist in the original 1932 language, 
which originally required loans to be both indorsed and secured to the 
Reserve Bank’s satisfaction.340 Three years later, in 1935, Congress 
changed the language to permit indorsement or security to the Fed’s 
                                                                                                             
333. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 5-117 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2020). 
334. For a summary of the legal effect of these underwater mortgages, see Bank of 
America v. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. 1,995, 1,999-2,000 (2015). 
335. See, e.g., Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F. 3d. 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2015). 
336. 7(a) Loan Program: Terms and Conditions, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. 
https://www.sba.gov/partners/lenders/7a-loan-program/terms-conditions-eligibility 
[https://perma.cc/H8Y2-VXKA] (describing noncollateralized loan terms).  
337. Fed. Student Aid, Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized [https://perma.cc/3UZT-JQ2R]. 
338. Memorandum from Legal Div. of the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0901-2009-Memo-to-Scott-
Alvarez.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A29-M7NC]. 
339. Id. at 3 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A)).  
340. Pub. L. 72-203, § 210, 47 Stat. 709, 715 (July 21, 1932). 
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satisfaction.341 The Fed’s lawyers concluded that, on this basis, 
“indorsement alone serves a function that is similar to that of collateral: an 
additional security of repayment.”342 
Even more remarkable than this conclusion the memo’s separate 
conclusion about the quantity and quality of collateral that the Federal 
Reserve Act required in an emergency. “Under the extraordinary 
pressures currently existing in financial markets, it is possible that at 
certain points in time the current value of the assets pledged in support of” 
the Fed’s emergency lending programs “may not be equal in value to the 
face amount” of the loans offered.343 In other words, market conditions 
were sufficiently in flux such that a loan might be only partially secured.  
This was of no moment, according to the Fed’s lawyers. “The 
language of Section 13(3) imposes no requirements on the amount or type 
of security obtained by a Reserve Bank.”344 This “absence of any objective 
criteria in the statutory language for the sufficiency of collateral leaves the 
extent and value of the collateral within the discretion of the Reserve 
Bank.”345 Later, the lawyers concluded, after noting that Congress had only 
ever broadened emergency lending authority under 13(3), that “the scope 
of the Reserve Bank’s discretion in deciding what will be ‘satisfactory’ to 
it in connection with section 13(3) lending is extremely broad.”346  
This expansive interpretation supported the Fed’s expansive 
emergency lending programs of 2009. The primary compensation the Fed 
received for its emergency loans to AIG, for example, was AIG stock, a 
seemingly unnecessary form of compensation if AIG collateral fully 
secured the Fed’s loan.347 The Fed memo’s interpretation also enjoys some 
statutory support. As Alvarez et al. point out in their retrospective exercise 
in statutory interpretation, older statutes governing emergency lending by 
other entities “required [emergency] credit [to] be ‘fully and adequately’ 
secured, terms that do not appear in section 13(3).”348 Finally, it also enjoys 
a strong policy rationale. The volatility of asset prices during financial 
crises, along with the possibility of complete market failure in some asset 
classes, makes a requirement of full and adequate security for emergency 
lending very difficult to achieve. The more flexible standard offered by the 
Fed’s memo, by contrast, makes emergency lending practical.  
                                                                                                             
341. Pub. L. 74-305, § 322, 49 Stat. 714 (Aug. 23, 1935). 
342. Memorandum, supra note 338, at 5.  
343. Id. 
344. Id. 
345. Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added). 
346. Id. at 9.  
347. BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42953, GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR 
AIG: SUMMARY AND COST (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42953.pdf [https://perma.cc/L56D-
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Whatever the merits of the expansive interpretation of 13(3) 
developed by the Fed in 2009, though, it sits in obvious tension with the 
exacting interpretation that some of the same Fed officials offered to 
explain the legal barriers to bailing out Lehman.  
3. Lehman Brothers Was Different  
Fed officials are aware of the tension between the legal interpretation 
of 13(3) applied to Lehman Brothers and the interpretation applied later 
in the crisis. In testimony and unofficial legal analysis, prominent Fed 
counsel have cast Lehman’s legal questions in a different light. They assert 
that, unlike the other institutions supported by the Fed’s emergency 
lending, Lehman was seeking a “naked guarantee” of all its legal 
obligations, not an emergency loan secured by collateral.349 As a result, the 
Fed could not provide the credit Lehman needed in spite of the significant 
discretion afforded by 13(3) described in the Fed’s 2009 internal memo. 
Thomas Baxter, the long-serving general counsel of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, put the legal question as follows while 
testifying before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: “Could the Fed 
issue a naked guarantee, a guarantee unlimited in amount . . . ? And the 
answer to that question is: As a matter of law, that cannot be done by the 
Federal Reserve.”350 In Baxter’s view, such a guarantee would not be 
“secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank,” and a naked 
guarantee “does not meet that statutory requirement.”351 Alvarez et al. 
similarly describe the Lehman loan as a request for an “open-ended” 
guarantee.352 According to these interpretations, loans to Lehman were 
not legal, even under the expansive interpretation of 13(3).  
The consistency or inconsistency of the Fed’s interpretations of 13(3) 
split the FCIC itself. A six-member majority essentially accepted the 
confidential memo’s assertion of “very broad” lending authority; they 
accused the Fed of using Section 13(3)’s supposed constraints as an ex post 
justification for what was really its mistaken policy judgment not to save 
                                                                                                             
349. “Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention 
and The Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis.” Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
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350. Id. at 163.  
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Lehman.353 Three dissenting members said there was nothing the Fed 
could lawfully have done.354 
4. Signaling When Statutes are Ambiguous 
The variation in these interpretations not only confirms the 
indeterminacy of Section 13(3)’s text. It also shows why there was so much 
confusion about why the Fed rescued Bear, but not Lehman—especially 
when emergency lending exploded in Lehman’s aftermath to support 
companies like AIG, money market mutual funds, commercial paper 
markets, and even shopping malls.355 The Fed had legitimate reasons for 
the legal interpretations it made. But those reasons neither reflected the 
full set of potentially viable legal options, nor were they explained with 
sufficient clarity for market participants to plan accordingly.  
The statutory indeterminacy just described—and the potential for 
opaque, unpredictable, and suboptimal decision-making that it creates—
remains with us, even after Congress’s revision of Section 13(3) in the 
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. In particular, the Fed’s power to lend still turns 
on the same two key conditions: that circumstances be “unusual and 
exigent” and that the loan be “indorsed or otherwise secured to the 
satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank.”356 These terms remain in the 
statute, undefined, although the statute makes more explicit the need to 
“ensure protection for the taxpayer” and for Reserve Banks to assign all 
loan collateral “a lendable value.”357 Indeed, in enacting Dodd-Frank 
Congress considered but rejected proposals that would have imposed 
substantially more specific requirements on the nature of the collateral 
required in an emergency.358  
E. Process-Oriented Emergency Lending: The Solution 
To improve the Fed’s signaling of its emergency-lending intentions, 
and increase the diversity of input into this power’s proper scope, the Fed 
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should issue public guidance documents interpreting its emergency-
lending authority and projecting how it may exercise this power. These 
guidance documents would supplement the new process requirements 
imposed by the Dodd Frank Act, making them more effective.  
Although we propose a specific guidance regime, our broader point is 
that guidance and rulemaking regarding 13(3) improves signaling and 
increases the robustness of the Fed’s legal analysis. Indeed, the Dodd-
Frank Act’s requirements represent a significant step towards process-
oriented emergency lending. Dodd-Frank requires that “the Board shall 
establish, by regulation . . . the policies and procedures governing 
emergency lending.”359 This notice-and-comment rulemaking provides 
better opportunities for feedback and signaling than the muddle preceding 
the financial crisis, in which the Fed issued no rules or guidance. Dodd-
Frank also instructs the Fed to provide less formal emergency lending 
guidance during a crisis. Within seven days of Fed emergency lending, the 
amended Section 13(3) requires that the Fed provide the Senate and 
House with “justification for the exercise of authority to provide such 
assistance.”360  
Dodd-Frank, however, creates an incomplete regulatory regime. 
Regulations issued during ordinary times cannot anticipate the market 
failures that bring about the next crisis. Moreover, the regulations that the 
Fed has in fact issued pursuant to Dodd-Frank risk a repeat of the 
emergency-lending muddle and exacting definition of security that 
characterized the last crisis.361 Given that, even as amended, Section 13(3) 
leaves to the Fed’s interpretation the meaning of key phrases, the Fed 
should increase clarity by issuing guidance on these questions and others 
that naturally emerge as financial crises unfold. Dodd-Frank’s repeated 
invocations of protecting taxpayers remain too vague a standard on which 
banks facing liquidity or solvency constraints can base their crisis-related 
planning.  
The guidance regime we describe is not a perfect solution: there are 
real risks that the Fed would prematurely commit to a lending regime later 
revealed to be deeply flawed. To resolve these concerns, the key feature of 
this guidance regime is flexibility. The Fed must articulate the broadest 
outlines of its authority and identify as best it can the nodes of discretion 
that might be exercised differently under different circumstances. We 
describe how this regime works in roughly four stages of a crisis: periods 
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of calm, periods of heightened concern, the moment of triggering 
emergency authority, and the end of a crisis. 
1. Guidance During Periods of Calm 
The statute and implementing regulations in 12 C.F.R. § 201 commit 
the Fed to follow “sound risk management practices,”362 an appropriate, if 
bland commitment that adds a modicum of clarity about how the Fed will 
evaluate emergency-loan requests. The Fed’s next challenge will be to 
determine how it will follow the statutory requirement to “assign a 
lendable value” to the collateral offered.363  
During periods of calm, a guidance document to supplement the 
interpretations of “lendable value,” “unusual and exigent circumstances”, 
and “secured to [the] satisfaction”364 of the Fed must be general. It would 
preserve flexibility but also describe the outer bound of the Fed’s 
interpretation of its legal authority. As for “lendable value,” the Fed could 
explain that the requirement means assigning such a value to collateral as 
an input to lending decisions rather than requiring that this value exceed 
the value of emergency loans extended. This interpretation preserves the 
Fed’s flexibility during a crisis.  
When explaining “unusual and exigent circumstances,” the Fed could 
clarify that recessionary pressures would not qualify as unusual, but that 
the failure of a systemically important financial institution would. The Fed 
could also, during a calm period, describe the kinds of market volatility 
that it will watch to determine whether circumstances have become 
“unusual and exigent,” without committing itself to a particular threshold. 
Here, the necessity of broad, diverse input is essential. As noted in Part II, 
one of the Fed’s principal blind spots has been a failure to understand 
threats outside their traditional epistemic framing. The Fed should 
clarify—and determine—whether it will be focused on leading indicators 
of market volatility,365 and alternatives,366 including the separate traditions 
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YVH5]. 
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of finance that have grown substantially in the wake of the crisis (for 
example, those writing in a Minskian tradition).367  
As an alternative or addition to these principles, during a period of 
calm, guidance might identify how the Fed will decide whether it can lend 
on an under-secured basis, what kinds of non-collateral “indorsements” 
might or might not qualify, and how these considerations affect collateral’s 
“lendable value.”368 The Fed need not commit itself to any specific course 
of action in discussing these principles, but at least this will permit market 
participants and others to understand better the outer limits of security or 
collateral that will be acceptable. The Fed can also describe more 
concretely what it means by “sound risk management practices”.369 The 
principal question will be the accounting standards that are appropriate in 
an emergency, given that “mark-to-market” accounting methods are likely 
to undervalue assets in a panic and “historical cost” accounting lends itself 
so well to manipulation.370 
2. Guidance During Initial Instability 
When periods of calm end, the Fed can and should issue additional 
guidance that gives more detail into how it will evaluate “unusual and 
exigent circumstances” and what constitutes appropriate indorsements or 
collateral. Dodd Frank, however, provides no mechanism for such 
guidance.  
Given the Fed’s posture in August 2007, the month that many 
observers identify as the beginning of the last financial crisis,371 it would 
have been appropriate to issue a guidance document indicating that 
volatility in the mortgage markets was not sufficient to trigger “unusual 
and exigent circumstances.” This would have sent the signal that the Fed 
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would not intervene with emergency-lending authority. Doing so might 
have pushed weaker banks and broker-dealers to find better private-sector 
solutions—bankruptcy, acquisition, capital increases—ahead of the March 
2008 crisis.  
Alternatively, the Fed could have issued guidance suggesting the 
opposite conclusion, similar to its responses to previous crises (such as the 
1987 market crash). This type of guidance would have aimed to reassure 
the public that major financial institutions’ inability to clear markets would 
constitute unusual and exigent circumstances, triggering massive Fed 
support. Striking the balance between market discipline and market 
reassurance will be a question for the central bankers of the day, in the face 
of economic and political constraints. What a guidance document will do, 
however, is permit the rest of society to hear the Fed explore that question, 
even if it preserves some leeway for providing the specific answers.372  
3. Guidance at (or Soon After) Emergency 
Central-bank behavior in a crisis is necessarily tentative, urgent, 
immediate. There is little time to offer the best rationale for interventions 
because market circumstances are changing at such a rapid clip. Even so, 
the Fed should not view the “justification” of emergency lending required 
by the Dodd-Frank Act373 as a mere hoop to jump through. In addition to 
explaining its actions to Congress, the justification required by Dodd-
Frank sends a signal to potential future borrowers and offers an avenue for 
critics to provide concrete feedback to the Fed.  
A “justification” issued at the time of 13(3) invocation should explain 
what, specifically, was unusual and exigent about the contemporaneous 
account. Here, the level of specificity will serve as policy tool: the more 
specific the description, the sterner the warning to market participants to 
seek private solutions; the more general the terms, the stronger the signal 
that there will be more emergency support along the way. This guidance 
should also consider the feedback that the Fed receives at the time of the 
action, including, for example, Paul Volcker’s unusual critique of Fed 
interventions in March 2008.  
Guidance around the quality and requirements of collateral and other 
securities will have the strongest punch here. The Fed’s justification will 
explain how it is applying its pre-existing emergency-lending regulations in 
the specific context of the crisis. If there is a change in the accounting 
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standards that relate to evaluating collateral and other securities—as 
would be expected during a crisis—this would be the time to announce it.374  
Crisis-period guidance issued by the Fed need not be limited to the 
justifications mandated by Dodd-Frank. Dodd Frank requires the Fed to 
issue timely justifications of its actions when the Fed invokes its Section 
13(3) powers. It says nothing about denials of Section 13(3) lending. Dodd 
Frank would thus have required justification from the Fed for Bear 
Stearns, AIG, etc., but not for Lehman, even though its Lehman decision 
was equally momentous. This asymmetry may impede signaling to other 
market participants, who only hear the Fed explain itself when it makes a 
loan. The Fed should rectify this asymmetry by voluntarily issuing 
guidance explaining its most important denials of emergency lending.375  
4. Guidance in Calm: Status Quo Ante 
After the crisis subsides, the Fed would then issue guidance returning 
to something approximating a status quo ante. The reason for this return 
is to ensure that the Fed’s statutory flexibility is preserved to fight the next 
crisis on its own terms, rather than restricted to circumstances that were 
“unusual and exigent” in the past but may not be in the future. It also 
permits flexibility around expectations for the public about how stern or 
flexible the Fed prefers to be in a time of calm.  
F. Policy Tradeoffs of Emergency Lending Guidance 
Besides making diverse input possible, announcing the agency’s 
plans, once selected, can serve a credible-commitment function that 
improves the incentives and behavior of market actors. The key for the 
Fed is not to rewrite the legislative rule on emergency lending it has 
already put in place, but to take advantage of flexible guidance documents, 
which avoid legislative rules’ high judicial and procedural barriers to 
modification. Guidance documents that outline the Fed’s sense of key 
provisions in Section 13(3) can embody a credible commitment that gains 
clarity and specificity over time, before, during, and after a crisis unfolds. 
Guidance documents that provide contingent and partial answers (rather 
than non-credible sweeping ones), allow officials both to stake their 
reputations on the reasoning behind the guidance and to receive input 
from a variety of actors. That diversity of input will not only increase the 
                                                                                                             
374. For an accusation that there was such a change following the collapse of Lehman’s 
holding company, see BALL, supra note 299, at 154-55.  
375. Dodd-Frank should not be amended to make such justification mandatory. 
Requiring an explanation for a failure to act could expose the Fed to excessive litigation. 
Voluntary guidance explaining inaction, by contrast, helps the Fed explain its most important 
decisions without imposing excess requirements on the Fed.  
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probability that the Fed will get the policy right. It will also underscore the 
agency’s intellectual seriousness about those policies and diffuse blame for 
any official who follows the guidance that a diverse set of actors agreed 
was best. These factors provide a virtuous cycle that increases the agencies’ 
incentives for soliciting input, articulating reasons, and following those 
policies. 
If the Fed signals its plans for emergency lending, it faces three 
tradeoffs. First, the Fed loses some of the flexibility that it would enjoy if 
it sent no signal at all. Still, it retains much flexibility is retained by using 
guidance as the vehicle and by giving partial and contingent answers when 
information is incomplete. Moreover, the option of “sending no signal”—
and thus maintaining total flexibility—does not really exist, as the 
emergency lending experiences in 2008 illustrated so abundantly. In a crisis 
that warrants emergency interventions on policy and social-welfare 
grounds, the Fed’s very actions—even if it acts without explanation—will 
create a narrative about official policy. Market actors will observe this 
narrative and use it to draw inferences about future agency behavior. The 
rescue of Bear Stearns shaped expectations notwithstanding the Fed’s 
opacity: firms like Lehman took greater risks, raising the risk of a crisis, 
and market actors in general assumed the Fed would intervene, meaning 
they were not prepared for crisis conditions. “Markets demand absolute 
certainty,” former Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson wrote in the 
aftermath of 2008.376 When actions inevitably send some signal of future 
behavior, the Fed is responsible for that signal, however noisy or even 
incorrect. It is thus better for the Fed to state expressly which inferences 
about its actions are appropriate, which are not, and how market 
participants and other observers should know the difference. 
The second tradeoff is that signaling may cause moral hazard. But this 
only happens if what the Fed signals is indulgence. If the Fed signals 
stringency, that can prevent moral hazard, a fact that loomed large over 
discussions about government actions in September 2008.377 The 
interpretation of Section 13(3) that Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson say 
forced Lehman’s failure could—if announced earlier—have altered 
Lehman’s incentives and behavior ex ante and averted or mitigated the 
crisis. (As Dr. Strangelove says, upon learning the Soviet enemy has built 
an irrevocable nuclear trigger for deterrence but failed to inform the 
United States about it, “The whole point of the Doomsday Machine is lost 
if you keep it a secret! Why didn’t you tell the world?”378) Going forward, 
if the Fed gives contingent and partial answers regarding its emergency-
                                                                                                             
376. PAULSON, JR., supra note 325, at 209.  
377. Id. at 193-222. 
378. DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE 
BOMB (Columbia Pictures & Hawk Films 1964).  
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lending plans, it might focus on identifying knowable scenarios and 
conditions under which it plans not to lend, while leaving this possibility 
open in other scenarios. And even if the Fed projects the conditions under 
which it will lend, that need not create moral hazard if the Fed accurately 
specifies the conditions of a true liquidity crisis—that is, conditions that 
market-actor mismanagement alone does not precipitate. 
The third tradeoff is that guidance entails some risk that courts may 
get involved, diminishing the Fed’s autonomy. When the Fed made 
emergency-loan decisions during the financial crisis in 2008-2009, it 
appears that no firm sued the Fed either to force it to make a certain loan 
or to prevent it from doing so.379 This absence of litigation may be 
explained partly by the fact that Fed decision-making was so opaque that 
nobody had any legal basis for a challenge. But it may also be due to the 
practicalities of financial-crisis conditions. A financial firm denied a bailout 
may collapse very quickly, leaving no time to litigate, and even if denied a 
bailout may want to stay in the Fed’s good graces (especially if transferred 
to the control of its creditors).380 Meanwhile, competitors may contemplate 
needing bailouts of their own and may likewise want to avoid antagonizing 
the Fed mid-crisis,381 or may simply view the rescue of their rivals as 
                                                                                                             
379. On the absence of traditional challenges to agency action during the crisis, see David 
Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1420-33 (2014). There was litigation, 
but it took the form of ex-post efforts to get compensation. Given that statutory government tort 
law allows no compensation for injury from how a federal agency exercises a discretionary 
function, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2018), which surely includes emergency loans, plaintiffs’ theories 
had to be (and were) quite extraordinary. Most prominent was AIG shareholders’ suit against the 
Fed over the terms of its bailout of their company, on a Fifth Amendment takings theory premised 
on the fact that the Fed demanded equity in exchange for AIG’s rescue (which the plaintiffs said 
the Fed lacked statutory authority to demand). So long as the Fed serves as lender rather than 
owner, this theory will be unavailable. And in any event, the plaintiffs (while winning on the 
merits) got zero damages, since their company would have been worse off absent the rescue. 
POSNER, supra note 11, at 88-102. More recently, the Second Circuit held that Federal Reserve 
Banks are agents of the federal government and that it is therefore possible to bring a False Claims 
Act suit against a firm that made misrepresentations to such a Bank in obtaining an emergency 
loan. United States ex rel. Kraus v. Wells Fargo & Co., 943 F.3d 588 (2d Cir. 2019).  Any such suit 
would have potential to find unlawful a firm’s representation of facts to the Fed, but not the Fed’s 
own criteria for how to make decisions as to given sets of facts. Further, any such suit would 
presumably occur well after the liquidity crisis had passed.  
380. The story may be different when firms seeking emergency relief are not in the 
financial industry. Non-financial firms may not be subject to the rapid and irrevocable collapse 
that comes with a run. Thus, during the Covid-19 economic crisis, firms denied emergency relief 
by the Small Business Administration have litigated against that agency, seeking to challenge its 
eligibility criteria. E.g., In re Hidalgo Cty. Emergency Service Found., 962 F.3d 838, 840 (5th Cir. 
2020).  
381. For a similar point, see Steven Davidoff Solomon & David Zaring, Transactional 
Administration, 106 GEO. L.J. 1097, 1103 n.27 (2018).  
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preferable to the risk of broader industry collapse.382 But if the Fed 
announces an approach through guidance in advance of a crisis, and that 
guidance seems to disadvantage certain firms, those firms will have time to 
try to seek judicial review of that approach before it is applied intra-crisis, 
through making actual emergency loans.383  
Even with our proposal to provide continually increasing clarity on 
the principal ambiguities that Section 13(3) leaves in place, the risk of 
litigation by financial firms—though real—is limited in various ways. First, 
financial firms have a market incentive not to look like they contemplate 
needing a bailout (though perhaps a trade association could sue on their 
behalf). Second, insofar as firms are challenging the guidance before a 
crisis occurs and before they are actually applying for emergency loans, the 
ripeness doctrine presents an obstacle to reaching the merits.384 Third, if 
                                                                                                             
382. One analogy may be the auto industry. See, e.g., Michelle Hartman, What Did 
America Buy with the Auto Bailout, and Was It Worth It?, MARKETPLACE (Nov. 13, 2018), 
https://www.marketplace.org/2018/11/13/what-did-america-buy-auto-bailout-and-was-it-worth-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/NT3B-L88B] (“Ford supported the GM and Chrysler bailouts to protect its 
supply chain and dealer network.”).  
383. The Board of Governors can litigate independently of the presidentially controlled 
Department of Justice, though there may be ambiguity regarding the matters to which this 
authority applies and how far up the judicial hierarchy it extends. 12 U.S.C. § 248(p) (2018). But 
the Fed’s precrisis guidance would need to be coordinated with the executive branch in any event, 
given the role that Dodd-Frank mandates for Treasury. And if precrisis Fed guidance suggests the 
Fed is unlikely to bail out certain firms who then challenge the guidance in court, the White House 
would normally have political incentives to seem antibailout and thus to back the Fed. 
384. The ripeness doctrine constrains challenges to legislative rules, and any constraint 
on challenging a legislative rule would apply a fortiori to challenging a guidance document. Under 
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, a court deciding whether a facial challenge to an agency rule, 
prior to the rule’s application to particular parties, is ripe for review must consider (a) the fitness 
of the issues for judicial resolution, including whether the agency action is final and whether the 
issues are purely legal or would instead benefit from additional factual development; and (b) the 
hardship to the parties of not allowing review of the rule prior to its application. 387 U.S. 136, 149 
(1967). Abbott Labs was immediately concerned with rules that banned or required conduct under 
some kind of penalty (as opposed to rules governing benefits); it found the requisite hardship 
where “a regulation requires an immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs’ conduct of their 
affairs with serious penalties attached to noncompliance.” Id. at 153. The Supreme Court has 
continued to suggest that facial challenges are appropriate for rules demanding changed behavior 
under penalties and has further suggested that they are appropriate only for such rules. Nat’l Park 
Hosp. Ass’n v. DOI, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003). Consistent with this, the Court, in Reno v. Catholic 
Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993), adopted reasoning that “seems sufficiently broad to 
preclude pre-application judicial review of any rule that purports to describe criteria for obtaining 
any form of government benefit,” 2 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 1650 (6th ed. 2019). In Reno, the challenged legislative rules 
purported to render certain undocumented immigrants ineligible for the statutory benefit of 
amnesty, and the Court held that those immigrants could not challenge the rules unless they had 
first applied for amnesty and been denied on the basis of the rules, even though such denial was 
certain with the rules in place, and even though the statute contained a special provision 
precluding lawsuits against the agency to challenge individual denials of amnesty (that is, 
immigrants who did apply and were denied would not have thereby gained an opportunity to go 
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the agency carefully drafts the guidance to refrain from purporting to block 
off future contestation and reconsideration of the plans and interpretations 
it lays out, there is a good chance that courts will consider the guidance 
“non-final,” which likewise blocks a pre-application challenge to the 
document from reaching the merits.385 Fourth, even if the plaintiffs did 
                                                                                                             
to court to get amnesty granted; they would only gain the opportunity to raise the unlawfulness of 
their denial as a defense if and when the agency put them into deportation proceedings). Reno, 
509 U.S. at 57-61. If the Fed invoked Reno to block preapplication judicial review of guidance 
pertaining to emergency lending, plaintiffs might argue that, if they are forced to wait to sue until 
after they actually apply for a loan midcrisis and are denied it, the result may be that they simply 
go under and practically never get any judicial review of the challenged guidance—a result that 
might seem inconsistent with Abbott Labs’ solicitude for plaintiffs suffering hardship and with 
administrative law’s general presumption in favor of judicial review. But this argument appears 
doubtful under Reno. In that case, the Court refused to find that immigrants suffered sufficient 
hardship from delaying review even though many immigrants had in fact refrained from applying 
for amnesty because the challenged rules purporting to render them ineligible deterred them 
(quite understandably) from applying, meaning that—given the unavailability of preapplication 
judicial review—these immigrants practically never got any judicial review of the challenged 
legislative rules. See 2 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra, at 1650 (discussing how the deterrent effect in 
Reno meant that “many eligible aliens had no practical opportunity to change their status”). In 
other words, practical foreclosure of all postapplication judicial review of a rule governing benefits 
is insufficient to render ripe a preapplication challenge. And although the Ninth Circuit has 
interpreted Reno (perhaps wrongly) to mean that a challenge to a rule governing benefits is ripe 
if “[i]t is inevitable that the challenge rule with operate to the plaintiff’s disadvantage—if the court 
can make a firm prediction that the plaintiff will apply for the benefit, and that the agency will 
deny the application by virtue of the rule,” Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 
1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), we think it unlikely 
that a court in a precrisis challenge could make such a prediction.  
385. Though the case law on exactly what sorts of guidance documents are “final” is 
subject to much confusion, nobody seems to think that such documents are generally final; rather, 
opinion ranges from considering them categorically nonfinal to believing that their finality 
depends on the circumstances. For a recent survey, see Steven J. Lindsay, Timing Judicial Review 
of Agency Interpretations in Chevron’s Shadow, 127 YALE L.J. 2448, 2456-74 (2018). There is 
prominent authority for the idea that a policy statement—that is, an agency’s officially tentative 
plan for how to exercise its discretion in future adjudications—is always nonfinal, even if regulated 
parties reading the statement think “the writing is on the wall” about what the agency will do. See, 
e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.2d 243, 251, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J.). 
Also, recent D.C. Circuit cases suggest that an interpretive rule—even one presenting the agency’s 
reading of a statute quite clearly—can nonetheless be nonfinal if the agency does not rely upon 
the rule as independent authority in subsequent adjudications, if parties in those adjudications can 
still challenge agency decisions therein to adopt the interpretive rule’s reasoning, and if the rule 
does not put parties at risk of a penalty or liability for ignoring the rule—a risk that would arise in 
the context of enforcement but apparently not in contexts like applications for permits or benefits. 
See Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 636-40 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Valero Energy 
Corp. v. EPA, 927 F.3d 532, 536-39 (D.C. Cir. 2019). To be sure, the Supreme Court did find 
reviewable the rescission of a guidance document in DHS v. Regents of the University of 
California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020), but the government there did not raise—and the Court 
did not consider—finality, perhaps because the rescission had indicia of finality that were 
relatively unique to the case (i.e., the document rescinded had arguably been a legislative rule to 
begin with, and even if not, the document had provided an elaborate process for making explicit 
individual grants of benefits to the very plaintiffs in the case, the renewal of which benefits was 
foreclosed by the rescission). We thank Ron Levin for a helpful exchange about this case.  
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reach the merits, the subject of emergency lending is so technical and 
reviewed so little by courts that judges would be quite likely to follow the 
agency’s view.386 And if the agency gets its approach upheld in court, that 
would only increase the strength of the signal.387  
G. The Fed’s Emergency Lending and COVID-19 
As described in the Introduction, the Fed has reactivated its 
emergency-lending authorities in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.388 
Others have more fully documented the Fed’s facilities than we have,389 
but the Fed’s responses have exposed it once again to criticism of unlawful 
action and inadequate explanations.  
One issue is relevant: the Fed’s interpretations of insolvency and the 
Fed’s clarity on eligibility for its novel emergency-lending facilities. The 
                                                                                                             
386. This kind of deference is based on information asymmetry and operates regardless 
of whether the Chevron doctrine applies or is even abandoned. ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S 
ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 31 (2016). Prior 
to Chevron, and also prior to many of the Supreme Court case-law developments on ripeness and 
finality cited in notes 384 and 385 supra, the Second Circuit treated an ex post challenge to Fed 
emergency lending in a manner that arguably involved reaching the merits, but with great 
deference to the agency: “Absent clear evidence of grossly arbitrary or capricious action on the 
part of either or both of [the Fed and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency] . . . it is not 
for the courts to say whether or not the actions taken were justified in the public interest, 
particularly where it vitally concerned the operation and stability of the nation’s banking 
system.”  Huntington Towers Ltd. v. Franklin National Bank, 559 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1977).  
387. Masur, supra note 45, at 1030. An additional litigation risk to Fed autonomy is if a 
firm that is denied an emergency loan during a crisis sues to force the Fed to make such a loan, on 
the ground that the guidance requires the loan. But unlike legislative rules, “agency policy 
statements do not bind an agency,” “[i]nterpretive rules ordinarily do not bind an agency,” and 
the “occasional cases holding an agency bound by its own interpretive rules can be explained on 
constitutional grounds,” 1 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE 437-38 (6th ed. 2019), which grounds we think have no application to emergency 
loans (e.g., such loans are not a statutory entitlement and thus not a property right subject to due 
process). To be sure, it is possible that the Fed, in order to depart from a guidance document with 
respect to particular loan decisions during a crisis, would need to give an explanation sufficient to 
satisfy a court that its departure from the guidance is not arbitrary or capricious. Indian River 
Cty., Fla. v. DOT, 348 F. Supp. 3d 17, 56 (D.D.C. 2018) (collecting relevant cases). But the Fed 
can write the guidance in the first place to allow for downstream flexibility, and besides, the Fed 
should think twice about departing from its plans during a crisis and should be able to provide a 
public explanation if it does so. (The White House, if facing an actual crisis and wishing for a 
bailout, might theoretically try to use the Department of Justice to prevent the Board of 
Governors from contesting such a challenge, given possible statutory ambiguities in 12 U.S.C. 
§ 248(p) (2018), discussed in note 383 supra. But the relevant Reserve Bank would be a necessary 
defendant, and the Reserve Banks are quasi-private entities that can litigate independently.) 
388. See supra text accompanying notes 2-8. 
389. See Menand, supra note 290; Jeffrey Cheng, David Skidmore & David Wessel, 
What’s the Fed Doing in Response to the Covid-19 crisis? What More Could It Do?, BROOKINGS 
(July 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/fed-response-to-covid19/ 
[https://perma.cc/DB6X-Z5YH]. 
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Federal Reserve Act, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 
prohibits the Fed from using its emergency lending authority to support 
“insolvent” institutions.390 Although the statute provides some definitional 
content to the term “insolvent”—an institution that has formally entered 
bankruptcy proceedings, for example, is insolvent for the statute’s 
purposes391—it also instructs the Fed to provide by regulation more clarity 
still. The Fed’s Regulation A, amended in 2013, defines an insolvent 
institution, in part, as one that is “generally not paying its undisputed debts 
as they become due during the 90 days preceding the date of borrowing” 
from the emergency facility.392  
This definition of insolvency is not required by statute. It is also 
remarkably ill-suited to the economic conditions associated with COVID-
19. There have been countless examples of otherwise solvent businesses 
that have decided not to pay “undisputed debts” during these periods of 
macroeconomic uncertainty.393 But the Fed has extended several 
emergency-lending facilities to these companies without verifying whether 
they fall into this category.  
The Fed may have a legal explanation that can rationalize Regulation 
A with its financing of firms that are ostensibly “insolvent,” but if so, it has 
not offered these explanations. The guidance regime we describe above 
will require the Fed to revisit Regulation A—whether through 
conventional notice-and-comment rulemaking or (in the midst of the 
COVID-19 pandemic) via an emergency rule under the appropriate 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.394 In either case, the Fed 
should reserve much more flexibility in Regulation A than the guidance 
system we describe can specify flexibly in the face of changing 
circumstances.   
Conclusion 
Many of the points here about the pros and cons of openness and 
transparency on Fed legal matters echo earlier discussions about Fed 
transparency on economic matters. Under the leadership of Fed Chair 
Alan Greenspan and many of his predecessors, the Fed was known for its 
                                                                                                             
390. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2018).  
391. See id. § 343(3)(B)(ii).  
392. 12 C.F.R. §201.4(d)(5) (2020). 
393. E.g., Leticia Miranda, What Happens to Main Street When Even the Biggest 
Retailers Can’t Pay Rent?, NBC (May 6, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-
news/what-happens-main-street-when-even-biggest-retailers-can-t-n1200781 
[https://perma.cc/XS3Z-GJZV] (listing large firms that have refused to pay landlords during 
pandemic shutdown).  
394. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2018).  
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Delphic pronouncements that gave little if any indication of the Fed’s 
intentions. Such opacity was believed to preserve the Fed’s freedom of 
action.395  
This is no longer the case. The new mantra is transparency, not 
secrecy. In one sense, this Article seeks to extend this transparency 
revolution from exclusively economic matters to the closely linked 
questions of the central bank’s generally applicable legal interpretations 
and its procedures for general, long-term policymaking, improving 
outcomes in monetary policy and emergency lending. 
Transparency is not an unmitigated virtue that central banks must 
simply maximize. Values of transparency must be optimized against other 
important goals, such as maintaining the integrity of internal deliberations 
or preventing outside strategic interests from hijacking regulatory 
processes. One context in which this tradeoff might disfavor transparency 
is that of “stress tests,” in which the Fed uses confidential models to decide 
whether large banks have taken sufficient precautions against adversity 
and forces them to act more conservatively if not.396 Compared with 
monetary policy or emergency lending, stress testing is an area where 
useful and relevant information is highly concentrated in a single, 
politically unified, self-interested group—that is, the large banks. As the 
Fed invites more participation in devising stress-test models, banks can 
increasingly dominate the agency’s modeling.397 But the more the Fed 
keeps its process for devising models confidential, the more it can develop 
those models independently, with less of the bias that arises from reliance 
upon bank-provided information. This builds up its own capacity for 
public-regarding autonomous judgment. Though full analysis of stress-test 
transparency is beyond the scope of this Article, we raise it as a potential 
example to illustrate that our call for Fed transparency has limits that 
depend on context. 
Our claim is that the Federal Reserve is an administrative agency 
whose legal interpretations and policy processes can and must be treated 
as such. The earlier transparency revolution on economic matters in 
central banking did not benefit from administrative law’s intense 
                                                                                                             
395. For an overview of these tensions, see Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Bank of Japan, Tokyo: Central Bank 
Independence, Transparency, and Accountability (May 25, 2010), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100525a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z6HY-GNVE].  
396. For an overview of transparency issues in stress testing, see Mark J. Flannery, 
Transparency and Model Evolution in Stress Testing, FED. RESERVE BANK BOS. (July 9, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3431679 [https://perma.cc/638X-2M2B].  
397. In our general discussion of the pitfalls of public participation, we noted the problem 
of environments dominated by a self-interested “policy development monopolist.” See supra 
Section I.B.2.c. Stress testing may be an instance of that. 
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engagement with the virtues and tradeoffs of transparency. By considering 
administrative law’s insights, central banking may develop better 
procedures for transparency about economic matters. And administrative 
law is similarly impoverished by the paucity of attention paid to central 
banks—perhaps the most powerful government agencies ever created. 
This Article invites more dialogue between these two academic and policy 
traditions, to consider what is (and ought to be) common and what is (and 
ought to be) idiosyncratic about central banking in an administrative law 
context—and doing the same for administrative law from a central banking 
perspective.  
 
